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ABSTRACT

A field experiment was carried out at the Recruit Training Command, San Diego, to test the effectiveness of utilizing the PLATO IV computer-based, on-line system for behavior change training. Some 38 company commanders were randomly assigned to experimental (training) or control (no training) groups. Programs were developed to: (1) assess the subject's intention to perform a given behavior; and (2) provide training in the behavior when the subject's behavior intention was discrepant from command expectations. Results taken from observations, self-reports, and reports by recruits showed that intentions can be modified and retained for substantial periods of time. This report describes research methodology and provides tabular summaries of results. (EMH)

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TECHNICAL REPORT: NAVTRAEQUIPCEN 74-C-0095-1

A FIELD TEST OF THE PLATO IV SYSTEM FOR COMPANY COMMANDER BEHAVIORAL CHANGE TRAINING

Department of Psychology University of Illinois Champaign, Illinois 61820

July 1976

Final Report for Period 21 August 1974 - 21 December 1975

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PREFACE

This report documents a first effort to evaluate training programs developed earlier in this project. The results of this research provide evidence that beliefs and behaviors of company commanders can be changed with the present programs. These findings are impressive; however, they are still considered quite conservative estimates of the potential contained in the training approaches. This is because the research was conducted under conditions of training and measurement that limited the manifestation of more pronounced effects. Moreover, the significance of even small measures of success in this area should not be underestimated. A change in the performance of only one behavior (e.g., asking other company commanders for help with their companies) may influence considerable aspects of the daily activities of a company commander.

The particular beliefs and behaviors addressed as well as the training procedures employed in this research were determined by previous research performed under this project. This prior work suggested that discrepancies between the policies of an organization (the Recruit Training Command in this case) and its practices might be reduced by computer programs that increase knowledge and appreciation of the policies. Policy makers benefit from this technology because it helps render their desires more acceptable to others. The people for whom the policies are intended also benefit because the training enables them to achieve greater harmony with their work environment. These processes of communicating and comprehending the details by which an organization operates involve some of the most fundamental and frustrating tasks facing the membership of an organization. The present technology can reduce some of this frustration. Future efforts will be aimed at remedying some of the limitations discovered in the present study to make the training maximally appropriate for use at Recruit Training Commands.

This work is sponsored by the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center under Project 43-03 PO3A for evaluating PLATO IV technology. Appreciation is expressed to personnel at the Recruit Training Command, San Diego, who in many ways made this effort possible.

ARTHUR S. BLAIWES Project Psychologist



SUMMARY

The effectiveness of utilizing the PLATO IV system for behavioral change training was tested within the framework of a field experiment. Thirty-eight company commanders (CC), matched on the basis of their company commander schooling performance, were randomly assigned to either the experimental (received PLATO training) or the control (no training) group. The results indicated that PLATO was a highly effective device for behavioral intention changes.

Also included within the study were self-report measures of the company commanders' behaviors and recruits' perception of their company commanders' behaviors. These measures were an attempt to assess possible training effects in the actual job setting. Three aspects of the study may have affected these behavioral measures: (1) feedback presented during the PLATO training was limited to a small number of CC's for any one behavioral item, (2) the selfreport measures were taken at the end of the nine week training period and during this period, members of the experimental and control groups freely interacted with one another as well as with other training personnel (e.g., regimental officers and more experienced CC's in their training groups), and (3) the recruit perception measures were taken on the 2-5 day of training (i.e., during primary training) and some of the behaviors being asked about would not occur until later in the training schedule (i.e., during the advanced training phase). Despite these problems, the CC's intentions were found to be significantly related to their self-reported behaviors and the recruits' perceptions of their behaviors. Moreover, the self-reports were significantly related to the recruit perceptions. Thus, the changes in intentions produced by PLATO training were reflected in behavior. Of equal importance, the changes in intentions were found to persist over time. It is thus concluded that the PLATO system is an effective device for behavior change training and its further use is recommended.

Unfortunately, these behavioral differences between experimental and control CC's did not seem to affect such things as the CC's attitudes toward various aspects of the Navy, their satisfaction with their jobs, or the morale or performance of their companies. Although disappointing, these findings were not unexpected. Although PLATO training can effectively change CC behavior, the effect of such changes on other criteria is an empirical question that must be studied independently.



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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

The concept of behavioral change training is an intriguing organizational endeavor. There are many alternative procedures that could be employed for a behavioral change training program; this report will discuss the utilization of a computer based instructional system, PLATO IV. PLATO is an acronym for Programmed Logic for Automatic Teaching Operations, a system developed at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign.

Specifically, this report will discuss the field experimental test of PLATO materials developed by the investigators during the previous contract year, 1973 - 1974. As indicated in our previous report (Cohen and Fishbein, 1975), specific behaviors of company commanders (CC) at Recruit Training Command (RTC), San Diego, California, were identified by observational and interview procedures. A subset of these behaviors were then selected by the Command staff as being important behaviors for CC's in the performance of their duties.

Consistent with Fishbein's (1973) theoretical approach to the attitude-behavior relationship, we found that the behavioral intentions for these behaviors were not predictable from traditional attitude, satisfaction, or morale scores, but were predictable from attitudes toward performing the behaviors and/or normative beliefs concerning the behaviors. Based on these findings, a PLATO program was developed to (a) assess an individual's behavioral intention to perform each of the chosen behaviors and (b) provide training on those behaviors where the CC reported a behavioral intention that was discrepant from Command expectations. The main purpose of this program was to change CC's intentions and thus, consequently the corresponding behaviors.

A second program was also written at this time. This program was concerned with providing CC's with information about the criteria that are used to evaluate CC performance. More specifically, the program was designed to inform CC's of the relative importance of each criterion used within the evaluation process. The present study tests the effectiveness of these two PLATO IV programs.

SECTION II

METHOD

SUBJECTS. Thirty-nine individuals who had just completed their training at company commander school were contacted about participating in the study.

Fishbein, M. The prediction of behaviors from attitudinal variables. In K. K. Sereno and C. D. Mortensen (Eds.), Advances in Communication Research. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. See also Fishbein, M. and Ajzen, I. Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research. Boston:

Addison-Wesley, 1975.



Cohen, J. L. and Fishbein, M. Development and research utilizing the PLATO IV system for company commander behavioral change training. Naval Training Equipment Center, August, 1975 (Report No. NAVTRAEQUIPCEN 73-C-0129-1)

The investigator fully explained the purpose and procedures of the study and asked each individual to give his consent for participation. Only one individual refused to participate and was released from any further obligations. The 38 individuals who agreed to take part in the study were from three different graduating classes at the school. Within each class, individuals were matched on their class standing and then randomly assigned to either the control (N=19) or to the experimental (N=19) group:

PROCEDURE. Upon graduation from company commander school, the individuals observed or "shadowed" a company in the field for approximately two weeks. All 33 individuals were contacted at the end of their "shadow" period for their initial participation in the study. All members of each of the three graduating classes met with the investigator (as a group) in a morning session. At this session, the procedures of the entire study were explained and any questions were answered. The group of CC's then were administered the pretest questionnaire. Half of the individuals (assigned to either the control or experimental group) were then instructed to proceed to the facility housing the PLATO terminals. The remaining individuals were instructed to meet at the PLATO facilities two hours later. This splitting of the entire class into two groups was necessitated because of the limited number of terminals available to RTC (8 terminals maximum at a time) and this explanation was readily accepted by the individual CC's. The two groups were unaware that individuals had been randomly assigned to either the control or experimental groups and no mention was made that the two groups would undergo differential training.

Both groups, the experimental and the control group, interacted with the PLATO system for approximately the same amount of time and viewed the same type of materials. The only difference between the two groups was in terms of the information presented in interacting with PLATO; the experimental group received appropriate training feedback depending upon their responses to the programs. The control group merely responded to the programmed questions; thus, they received no training feedback in their interaction with the PLATO system.

Each individual was then assigned to his first company according to the recommendation of the pick-up order from the company commander school and the needs of RTC. Only 27 of the CC's were assigned companies during the time period we had allotted for data collection. All 27 picked up their first companies within one month of their PLATO training. Of the 11 CC's who were not assigned to a company during our data gathering period, ten were second class petty officers and the other individual was hospitalized and was unable to assume his duty. These second class petty officers were assigned as assistant CC's to a company and after completing this assignment were then assigned to their own company. Because of this extra assignment, these individuals were not assigned their own company until three months after their PLATO training and subsequently too late to be included in the field data collection phase of the study.

During the nine week period of leading a company, we collected data on the performance of each of the 27 companies led by these CC's. We also planned on administering a questionnaire to the entire company (i.e., the recruits) at the end of primary training (the 2-5 day) and at the end of advanced training (5-2



day). Due to administrative difficulties beyond our control, we were only able to collect recruit data from 20 of the 27 companies on the 2-5 day.

At the completion of leading the first company (nine weeks), the CC's were asked to respond to a final questionnaire. This questionnaire was administered by the staff at the company commander school; the individual CC was handed the questionnaire with a cover letter, instructions, and an addressed stamped envelope. After completing the questionnaire, the CC put the questionnaire into the envelope and sealed it himself, thus insuring confidentiality of responses. Of the 27 CC's who led companies, 24 returned the final questionnaire. Two second class petty officer CC's also returned this final questionnaire increasing the sample to 26 for analyses purposes.

Because of the time delays and administrative difficulties encountered, the sample sizes for the data analyses change according to the analysis being performed. To recapitulate, there were 38 individuals (19 experimental and 19 control) available for the pretest questionnaire data and for the PLATO training analyses. Twenty-seven individuals (13 experimental and 14 control) have company performance data and twenty companies (9 experimental and 11 control) have recruit questionnaire data available for analysis purposes. For the final questionnaire after completion of the first company, we have data for 26 individuals (12 experimental and 14 control). Complete sets of data (i.e., pretest, PLATO, company performance, recruit responses, and final questionnaire) are available for 17 individuals (7 experimental and 10 control).

MATERIALS

PRETEST QUESTIONNAIRE. This questionnaire was similar to the one developed in the previous year of our work. The questionnaire was comprised of four sections: (1) demographic information; (2) general traditional attitude measures toward (a) Being a company commander, (b) Trying to brigade, (c) Pushing a company, (d) Today's navy, and (e) New recruits; (3) attitudes toward performing 40 specific behaviors (only 32 of these behaviors were used in the actual PLATO training); and (4) normative beliefs about "most other respected company commanders". This questionnaire is included as appendix A.

FEEDER EVALUATIONS. For each assignment at RTC, the individual CC is evaluated by his supervisor. For the individuals within the study, we have feeder evaluations obtained upon (1) graduating from company commander school, (2) the completion of the company's primary training (Regiment 1), and (3) the completion of the company's advanced training (Regiment 2). These evaluation forms are input for the individual's yearly evaluation report at RTC. (See appendix B).

COMPANY PERFORMANCE DATA. Data on a variety of organizational criteria used at RTC San Diego were obtained from the Military Evaluation Division (MED).

Needless to say, part of the problem was due to the distance separating the investigators from the RTC base. Since the CC's picked up their first companies at different points in time, it was neither practical nor possible for us to administer the recruit questionnaire ourselves. Although we had made arrangements to have the questionnaires administered for us, and although we were informed that data collection was progressing satisfactorily, we were only told after it was too late to do anything, that we did not have complete data from the 2-5 day and that the data from the 5-2 day were "lost".



These scores include an overall performance rating as well as day-by-day and week-by-week scores for (a) personnel inspection (PI), (b) morning barrack inspection (MBI), (c) locker inspection (IKR), (d) individual recruit evaluations (IRE), (e) infantry, (f) academics, (g) streetmarks, (h) rifle marksmanship, and (i) competitive sports. Additional organizational data referring to company performance (e.g., company GCT scores, convening company size, departing company size, and changes in company roster) were also obtained.

RECRUIT PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE. A short questionnaire was designed to assess the recruits' perceptions of their training and their company commander. This questionnaire was administered to the entire company at the beginning of the Human Goals class on the 2-5 day of training. The instructions indicated that the responses were to be anonymous and that the results would not affect the company's ratings or the ratings of their company commander. The questionnaire itself was composed of five parts: (1) company and personal information, (2) feelings about the company and morale, (3) perception of whether their CC performed or did not perform each of the 32 behaviors included in the PLATO training, (4) attributes of their company commander, and (5) pictorial scales of feelings about the company and morale. This questionnaire can be found in appendix C.

FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE. The final questionnaire was designed to overlap with the pretest questionnaire and also included some additional items. The additional items were: (a) a pictorial scale of satisfaction with job as CC, (b) self-report of performance or nonperformance of each of the 32 specific behaviors during training of their first company, (c) behavioral intentions to perform each of the 32 behaviors while leading their next company, (d) normative beliefs concerning the Military Training Officer (MTO), and (3) questions concerning recruit training philosophy and job satisfaction (appendix D).

PLATO PROGRAMS. The main training program was concerned with training company commanders to hold "correct" behavioral intentions with respect to a variety of behaviors that are used in recruit training. More specifically, 32 behaviors that may occur during recruit training were identified. These behaviors were selected because (1) previous research found wide variations among CC's in terms of performance and (2) they were judged to be important by the RTC staff. Briefly, the program first assesses the CC's intention to perform (or not to perform) each of the 32 behaviors. His intentions are then compared with the "correct" set of intentions (i.e., the behavioral expectations of the RTC staff, see table 3). Thus, the program identifies those intentions of the CC that are discrepant with RTC's behavioral expectations. Behavior change training is then provided for each discrepant or "incorrect" intention.

Consistent with Fishbein's (1973, Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) theoretical approach, the program attempts to change intentions by changing the CC's attitude toward performing the behavior and his normative beliefs about



See footnote 2.

performing the behavior. More specifically, the program first asks the individual to identify his five most important goals as a CC. He is then asked to consider each of his discrepant intentions in terms of these goals. That is, he is asked to indicate whether carrying through the intention would lead to (or block) the attainment of each of the five chosen goals. Since he is only asked to do this for "incorrect" intentions, it is hoped he will see that performing this behavior will not lead to most of his goals. The relations between his intention and goals are pointed out to him and he is asked to reconsider his intention in the light of this new information. He is then asked to indicate whether the MTO thinks he should (or should not) perform the behavior in question. He is told whether his perception is correct or incorrect and then asked to reconsider whether performing the behavior would lead to his goals, given these expectations of the MTO.

Thus, for each discrepant intention, the program not only provides information about the expectations of a relevant other (normative belief), but it also encourages the CC to think about the consequences of performing the behavior in relation to the attainment of his goals. Since these beliefs about performing the behavior determine the attitude toward performing the behavior, making these beliefs salient or changing them in an appropriate direction should change the attitude. According to Fishbein's theory, making the CC aware of the expectations of the MTO and of the negative consequences of carrying out his "incorrect" intentions should change the CC's intention in the direction specified by the RTC staff.

After this procedure is completed for each discrepant intention, the individual is asked to consider his set of intentions in conjunction with the stated mission of RTC. A copy of the mission is presented on the screen for the CC to review. The entire set of 32 behaviors is then presented again for a reassessment of the behavioral intentions. This reassessment serves as the criterion to identify change in behavioral intentions, and it thus provides a test of the effectiveness of this type of program for behavioral change training (samples from the behavioral intentions program are contained in appendix E).

The second program was also utilized in this training period. As mentioned above this program was concerned with the criteria used in evaluating the overall performance of a company commander. More specifically, on the basis of work conducted during our previous contract year, six criteria used to evaluate CC's were identified. These six criteria (i.e., handling setbacks, standings in competition, cooperating with those in chain of command, company's conduct after competitive period, showing interest in recruits, and pushing a balanced company) were then used to generate company commander profiles. That is, a CC was described as being outstanding, above average, average, below average or very poor on each of the six criteria. Within this program, CC's are first asked to rank the six criteria in terms of their perceived importance. They were then presented a series of 40 profiles and asked to evaluate the overall performance of the individual described by each of the profiles. Of the 40 such profiles presented, the first 10 and the last 10 profiles were exactly the same. allowed us to assess the reliability of the user's judgments. At the end of all 40 profiles, the individual was presented feedback on how he used each of the six criteria (i.e., how much weight he actually placed on each criterion) and compared these weights with his initial rankings of importance. He was also given information concerning the reliability of his judgments. In addition,



information about the way in which the MTO and the head of the company commander school used the same criteria (i.e., he was shown the weights obtained by the MTO and the head of CC school) was presented. After the feedback information was presented, the individual was then instructed to role play the MTO in making judgments for 30 additional profiles. In this manner the individual not only learned about the MTO's judgment process but now had to simulate it himself. The purpose of this program was to acquaint the individual CC with relevant information on how he is evaluated in the field by his supervisors (see appendix F for a sample profile).

Both of these PLATO programs utilized the unique capabilities of a computer system in that complex branching and data manipulation were performed on-line in an interactive manner with the individual user.

The experimental group viewed the behavioral intention program first going through the procedures described above (i.e., behavioral intention assessment, appropriate feedback, and reassessment of intentions). The program dealing with the profile judgments was presented as a second task. Here again, the experimental group completed the entire program with the appropriate feedback presented (i.e., 40 profile judgments, feedback and information of MTO's judgments, and role playing the MTO for 30 judgments).

The control group performed the same two tasks, the only difference being the withholding of the feedback within each program. Control individuals first indicated their behavioral intentions. As an interpolated task, they next performed only the role playing phase of the profile judgments program. Finally their behavioral intentions were reassessed. Thus, both groups performed the same type of tasks within the same time periods with the only difference being that the experimental group was given feedback during their interaction with the PLATO system.

SECTION III

RESULTS

The reporting of the analyses and results will follow the experimental procedures outlined in the previous section. It should be recalled that the PLATO programs to be tested were written on the basis of our earlier work investigating the attitude-behavior relationship. We revalidated the adequacy of such an approach on the sample of individuals participating in the study and found that these behavioral intentions could be predicted from the attitude toward performing the behavior and/or the normative beliefs concerning the behavior. The average multiple correlation of predicting behavioral intentions from the attitude toward performing the behavior and the normative beliefs assessed on the pretest questionnaire was +.62. Thus, the theoretical model used to guide the construction of the PLATO program for behavioral intentions was also supported with this new sample of individuals.

PRETRAINING MEASURES

PRETEST QUESTIONNAIRE. The control group and experimental group were compared on each section of the pretest questionnaire measures. Since all



individuals had undergone the same training and were randomly assigned to one of the groups, no differences were expected for these comparisons.

As can be seen in the following table, the two groups did not differ significantly on selected demographic measures.

TABLE 1. MEAN RESPONSE FOR DEMOGRAPHIC MEASURES

Item	Experimental	Control	t-Value
Age (in years)	29.84	31.57	1.019
Years in Navy	11.52	12.78	0.723
Education level	3.42	3.05	1.341
Marital status b	2.05	1.89	0.793

a Response alternatives were 1=grammar school, 2=some high school, 3=high school graduate, 4=junior college graduate, 5=some college, and 6=college graduate

The experimental and control groups did not differ significantly on any of the traditional measures of attitude (see table 2), on any of the attitudes, toward performing the 40 behaviors listed in the questionnaire (see appendix G), or on any of the normative beliefs about the expectations of other company commanders (see appendix H).

TABLE 2. MEAN SUMMATED RESPONSES FOR THE TRADITIONAL ATTITUDE MEASURES

Attitude Object	Experimental	Control	t-Value
Being a company commander	43.95	45.26	0.67
Trying to brigade	42.21	41.37	0.40
Pushing a company	42.37	42.11	0.12
Today's Navy	40.68	39.37	0.40
New recruits	36.95	39.10	1.16

Note: These mean values are based on the sum of the 8 subscale values (1.7) for each attitude object where the higher the value the more positive the evaluation. All t-tests are two-tailed with 36-degrees of freedom.



Response alternatives were 1=never married, 2=presently married, 3=divorced not remarried, 4=legally separated, and 5=widower

FEEDER EVALUATIONS. At the completion of company commander training school, each individual was evaluated by his instructors on the 20 categories listed on the feeder evaluation form. For each category, the experimental and control groups were compared with t-tests. Of the 20 comparisons only one significant difference was found; this was for the category of personal appearance (t=2.35, df=36, p <.05). The mean for the experimental group was 8.31 and the mean for the control group was 9.15. The mean values for all 20 categories are presented in appendix I.

Each individual was also graded on examinations, homework, and class performance during their training at CC school. The overall grade point average (GPA) for the six-week training period was also compared for the two groups. As expected, no significant difference for the GPA comparison was found. The GPA means were 85.52 and 86.16, respectively, for the experimental and control groups.

PLATO INTENTION ASSESSMENT. These data are concerned with the behavioral intentions assessed on the PLATO system before the initiation of any training. Of the 32 behavioral intentions, there was only one intention on which the experimental and control groups differed significantly; this intention was to "punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection" (item number 12). The experimental group was significantly less likely to intend to perform this behavior than the control group. Table 3 presents the means for each group for each of the 32 behaviors. This analysis again demonstrated the equivalence of the experimental and control groups before the initiation of the training phase.

It is also important to point out that there was no significant difference between the two groups for the comparison of the number of discrepant intentions at this time. No differences were found in analyzing the total number of discrepant intentions (including those intentions for which the individual responded with a neutral response indicating uncertainty in either intending or not intending to perform the behavior); the experimental group had a mean number of discrepant responses of 10.79 while the control group had a mean of 11.37. If neutral responses are not included in the comparison of discrepant intentions, then the experimental mean number was 4.79 and the control mean was 4.95.

Not only was there no difference in the mean number of discrepant intentions for the two groups, but no difference was found for the number of discrepancies as a function of the behaviors. Table 4 presents the number of discrepant intentions for each group for each behavior. As can be seen in this table, the two groups are extremely similar in the number of discrepancies for each behavior. This would be expected considering that all individuals had undergone similar training at company commander school.

To summarize, there were no significant differences found between the experimental and control groups on a variety of pretraining measures.

PLATO TRAINING MEASURES

The following set of results is concerned with various measures assessed at the completion of the PLATO training. It should be recalled that the



TABLE 3. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t VALUES FOR INITIAL PLATO BEHAVIORAL INTENTION ASSESSMENT BY GROUP

	or an experience of the second of the secon		<u>cp</u>	Control		•	
	<u> </u>	x	SD	Ī	SD	t	
1.	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	3.58	1.30	3.74	.99	.42	
2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	4.11	1.15	4.16	.69	.17	
3.	Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	4.16	1.26	3.74	.99	1.15	
4.	Pre check lockers prior to an inspection.	3.84	1.01	4.16	1.01	.96	
5.	Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons.	4.21	.71	4.37	. 83	.63	
6.	Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	1.21	.53	1.21	.53	0.0	
7.	Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	4.68	.48	4.68	.48	0.0	
8.	Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	4.47	.61	4.47	.61	0.0	
9.	To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	4.74	.45	4.53	.69	1.10	
10.	Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline.	2.32	1.16	2.37	1.21	.13	
11.	Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	3.89	1,19	3.47	1.43	.98	
12.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	1.79	1.18	2.63	1.30	2.08*	
13.	Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	1.47	.90	1.74	1.33	.71	
14.	Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	1.47	.96	2.11	1.24	1.75	
15.	Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	1.89	1.05	1.89	1.41	0.0	

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.



TABLE 3. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t VALUES FOR INITIAL PLATO BEHAVIORAL INTENTION ASSESSMENT BY GROUP (cont.)

		$\frac{\mathbf{E}}{\mathbf{X}}$	sp SD_	Cont	rol SD	. t
16.	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline.	1.26	.65	1.21	.54	.27
17.	Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority.	2.53	1.07	1.95	1.03	1.69
18.	Ask other CC to help teach infantry.	3.26	1.05	3.58	.77	1.06
19.	Select some recruit officers at R and O.	3.53	1.07	3.42	1.07	. 30
20.	Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.	2.84	1.07	2.79	.92	.16
21.	Allow my company to use "cheating gear."	2.42	1.39	2.68	1.20	.62
22.	Attend most instructor-conducted classes.	4.00	1.29	3.79	.92	.58
23.	Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes.	3.16	1.01	3.05	1.09	.31
24.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection.	2.05	1.27	2.58	1.07	1.38
<u>2</u> 5.	Automatically select a setback as my RCPO,	1.53	.84	1.58	.77	.2 0
26.	Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night.	4.68	.48	4.47	.69	1.08
27.	Discipline individual recruits in private.	3.16	1.17	3.05	1.13	.28
28.	Have more than two EPOs in one company.	3.95	1.08	3.63	1.26	. 83
29.	Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days.	4.05	1.03	4.26	. 87	.68
30.	Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points.	1.68	1.00	1.84	1.01	.48
<u>31</u> .	Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company.	3.21	.92	3.37	1.12	.47
32.	Learn the last name of every member of my company.	4.26	. 87	4.21	. 85	.18
						•

^{*} p<.05

Note: Scale scored l=definitely false, 3=neither true nor false, and 5=definitely true for intending to perform behavior



TABLE 4. NUMBER OF DISCREPANT INTENTIONS FOR INITIAL PLATO ASSESSMENT BY GROUPS

•		. Control	Exper	Total
1.	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	6	7	13
2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	3	4	7
3.	Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	6	3	9
4.	Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	3	6	9
5.	Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons.	18	18	36
6.	Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	1	1	2
7.	Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	0	0	0
3.	Give out demorits as a form of discipline.	1	1	2
9.	To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	2	0	2
10.	Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline.	9	10	19
11.	Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	9	7	16
12.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	. 11	5	16
13.	Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	4	4	8
14.	Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	7	4	11
15.	Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	6	7	13
		i		- -

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.



TABLE 4. NUMBER OF DISCREPANT INTENTIONS FOR INITIAL PLATO ASSESSMENT BY GROUPS (cont.)

		Control	Exper	Total
16.	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline.	1	2	3
17.	Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority.	7	11	18
18.	Ask other CC to help teach infantry.	7	11	18
19.	Select some recruit officers at R and O.	8	8	16
20.	Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.	13	12	25
21.	Allow my company to use "cheating gear."	11	9	20
22.	Attend most instructor-conducted classes.	8	3	11
23.	Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes.	11	14	25
24.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection.	10	7	17
25.	Automatically select a setback as my RCPO.	3	4	7
26.	Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night.	2	1	3
27.	Discipline individual recruits in private.	13	12	25
28.	Have more than two EPOs in one company.	8	7	15
29.	Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days.	3	4	7
30.	Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points.	4	5	9
31.	Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company.	17	16	33
32.	Learn the last name of every member of my company.	3	3	6



experimental group received feedback during their training while the control group received none.

EFFECTIVENESS OF BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS PROGRAM. As indicated above, prior to the PLATO experience, experimental and control company commanders did not differ in the number of correct intentions they held. Generally speaking, most CC's intended to perform (on the average) five (5) behaviors that the training command did not want them to perform, and had no intentions concerning six (6) other behaviors for which the training command had specific expectations. That is, of the 32 specific behaviors we considered, most company commanders intended to perform the correct behavior in 21 cases, were uncertain about their intentions in 6 cases and intended to perform the incorrect behavior in 5 cases. To put this somewhat differently, of the behaviors considered, the average company commander intended to behave correctly only 65% of the time.

Consistent with expectations, and in support of the effectiveness of the PLATO program, following training the number of discrepant intentions significantly decreased for experimental CC's, but not for control CC's. More specifically, following PLATO training, experimental CC's intended to perform 84% of the behaviors correctly while control CC's still intended to perform correctly only 67% of the behaviors. That is, while control CC's still intended to perform five incorrect behaviors and were still uncertain about their intentions with respect to six other behaviors, experimental CC's intended to perform the incorrect behavior in only two cases and were only uncertain with respect to three other behaviors. The mean number of discrepancies for experimental and control CC's (with and without the consideration of neutral responses) can be seen in table 5, and table 6 presents the 2 (experimental versus control) by 2 (pre versus post PLATO training) analysis of variance of these data. The significant interaction provides strong evidence for the effectiveness of the PLATO training program.

The change in the number of discrepant intentions is graphically shown in figure 1. As can be seen in this figure, the number of discrepancies for the experimental group shifts significantly towards the low end of the scale while the number of discrepancies in the control group show very little change. There seems to be little question that PLATO training was effective in changing behavioral intentions in the direction specified by the RTC staff.

A more specific analysis of the change in discrepant intentions is to look at the proportion of changes in the proper direction for each individual within the two groups. This analysis provides further support for the effectiveness of PLATO training in changing behavioral intentions to conform to the RTC staff's expectations. It should be recalled that the number of discrepant intentions varied among CC's. Thus, while one CC may have only received training on three behaviors, another CC might have initially had 10 or 12 discrepant intentions. It seems reasonable to consider the proportion of discrepant intentions that changed in the correct direction compared to the total number of discrepant intentions assessed on the pretest. For the experimental group, this proportion indicated the number of items changed in the proper direction given the total number of items for which feedback was presented. This proportion for the control group represented the number of items that randomly



TABLE 6. MEAN NUMBER OF BEHAVIORAL INTENTION DISCREPANCIES ASSESSED ON THE PLATO SYSTEM

Including Neutral Responses:

	Pretest	After training	
Control	11.37	10.53	10.95
Experimental	10.79	5.10	7.95
	11.08	7.82	

Excluding Neutral Responses:

	Pretest	After training	
Control	4.95	4.58	4.76
Experimental	4.79	1.74	3.26
	4.87	3.16	. •

TABLE 7. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR THE NUMBER OF BEHAVIORAL INTENTION DISCREPANCIES ASSESSED ON THE PLATO SYSTEM

Source	dF	Including <u>MS</u>	Neutral <u>F</u>	Excluding Neutral $\underline{\text{MS}}$ $\underline{\underline{F}}$
Treatment	1	171.00	5.80*	42.75 6.31*
Within Groups	36	29.47		6.77
Testing	1	202.32	18.15**	55.59 23.09**
Treatment x Testing	1	111.37	9.99**	34.22 14.21**
Within groups x Testing	36	11.15		2.41

^{*} p < .05



^{**} p<.01




Figure 1. Discrepancy Shifts From Pre-Training To Post-Training For Experimental And Control Groups

changed in the proper direction (no feedback was presented) for the total number of items judged to be discrepant in the pre-test. A comparison of the mean proportion for each group found a significant difference between the two groups (Z=3.36, p <.001). The mean proportion change in the proper direction for the experimental group was .84 while the mean for the control group was .30. See table 7 for the individual CC proportion data.

Thus, it can be seen that on the average, 84% of the initial discrepancies in the experimental group changed in the correct direction while this was only true for 30% of the discrepancies in the control group. To put this somewhat differently, PLATO training was effective 84% of the time it was used. In contrast, without such training, only 30% of the incorrect intentions changed in the right direction. There was no significant difference between the two groups in the mean proportion of incorrect responses. The mean proportion for the experimental group was .027 and the mean proportion for the control group on changes in the wrong direction was .054.

In addition to considering each CC, it is also possible to consider each behavior separately. The responses to the second assessment of the behavioral intentions (after the PLATO training) were also compared for the two groups. It should be recalled (see table 3) that only one significant difference was found in comparing the two groups on the pretest assessment of behavioral intentions. For the post-training assessment, the experimental and control groups were found to significantly differ on seven of the behavioral items. For each of these seven items, the experimental mean was in greater accord with the expectations of the RTC staff than the control group mean. Table 8 presents the mean responses for each of the 32 behaviors for the two groups.

Such an analysis, however, is problematic. It must be recalled that only experimental CC's received training, and further, the number of CC's receiving training varies considerably across behaviors. That is, as can be seen in table 4, there were some behaviors where little or no training was necessary. · (1.e., where three or fewer of the experimental CC's held incorrect intentions). It would be unreasonable to expect a significant mean change in the experimental group intention to perform a given behavior if only a small proportion of the group actually received training. That is, it is reasonable to assume that the greater the number of individuals who receive training on a given behavioral item, the more likely one will find an effect for that item. In other words, in order for the training to produce an effect (at the group level), a sufficient amount of training must have occurred. Taking this into account, it can be seen in table 4 that there are only eight behaviors for which at least 10 mumbers (about half) of the experimental group received training. Table 9 presents the pre- and post-training means of the experimental and control groups for these eight intentions. There it can be seen that in every case, the experimental mean changes in the correct direction while the control mean remains relatively constant. As in our previous analyses of the number of discrepancies, the major test of the effectiveness of PLATO training focuses on the interaction between training and time of testing. Table 10 presents the analysis of variance results for each of the behaviors. There it can be seen that the interactions are significant in six of the eight cases, and they approach significance in the remaining two. Thus, even at the level of individual behaviors it can be seen that PLATO training is a highly effective way of producing changes in behavioral intentions.



TABLE 7. PROPORTION OF BEHAVIOR INTENTION ITEMS CHANGING IN THE PROPER DIRECTION AFTER PLATO TRAINING

	w				20) ·			
	SUBJECT:	Experimental:	No. items changed in proper di-	No. items given feed- back	Proportion 3	Control:	No items changed in proper di- rection	No. items discrepant on pre-test	Proportion
	-1		· L	12	8		4	œ	.50
	ΝI		ത	11	8		က	11	.27
	ကျ		01	10	1.00		9	ı	.55
	4.1		∞	13	. 62		က	14	.21
	ωl		n	14	. 79		H		.14
•	9 i			∞	. 88		8	12	.17
	- 1		∞	6	.89		ო		.43
	∞ I		10	01	1.00	•	. -	14	.07
	6		2	11	.64 1		H	91	90°
	21		ဖ	9	1.00		4	13	.31
	=1		10	12	. 83		, ຕ	14	.21
	21	•	. ∞	∞	1.00		∞	15	.53
	113	•	14	14	1.00		4	10	.40
	41		14	16	& &		N	က	.40
	15		7	œ	. 88	•	ß	14	.36
	16		11	n	1.00		ß	13	.38
	17		ဖ	15	40	:	. =	11	60.
	118		œ	6	68		4	14	.29
	61		4	œ	· &	٥	ო		.43
				,					

TABLE 8. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND t VALUES FOR BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS AFTER PLATO TRAINING BY GROUPS

	•						
		E	хр	Con	trol	,	
		<u> </u>	SD	Ī	SD	t	
1.	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	4.16	1.01			T -	
2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	4.21	1.18	4.16	. 83	.15	
3.	Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	3.89	1.24	3.94	.91	.15	
4.	Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	4.37	. 83	4.00	.88	1.33	
5.	Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons.	1.95	1.13	4.21	. 85	6.95**	
6.	Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	1,26	.56	1.16	.37	.68	
7.	Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	4.53	.69	4.53	.51	0.0	
8.	Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	4.32	1.11	4.32	.58	0.0	
9.	To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	4.68	.58	4.37	.59	1.65	
10.	Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline.	1.42	.77	2.32	1.11	2.89**	
11.	Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	4.26	1.04	3.68	1.33	1.49	
12.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	1.53	.77	2.79	1.13	4.01**	
13.	Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	1.42	. 84	1.68	1.29	.74	
14.	Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	1.74	1.33	1.84	1.17	.26	
15.	Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	1.58	.77	1.74	1.28	.46	
							

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.



TABLE 8. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND t VALUES FOR BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS AFTER PLATO TRAINING BY GROUPS (cont.)

	•					
		X Ex	D SD	Cont	rol Sp	<u>.</u>
16.	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline.	1.32	.58	1.26	. 56	.28
17.	Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority.	1.79	1.03	2.00	1.20	.58
18.	Ask other CC to help teach infantry.	4.05	1.08	3.63	. 89	1.31
19.	Select some recruit officers at R and O.	4.26	. 63	3.68	1.11	1.96
20.	Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.	1.79	. 85	3,05	1.13	3.89*⁴
21.	Allow my company to use "cheating gear."	1.79	1.03	2.42	1.26	1.69
22.	Attend most instructor-conducted classes.	4.10	.99	4,10	.74	0.0
23.	Allow my EPO . to handle most questions after TV classes.	1.89	.99	3.00	1.11	3.24**
24.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection.	1.58	.69	2.47	1.17	2.86**
25.	Automatically select a setback as my RCPO.	1.32	.67	1.42	.69	.47
26.	Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night.	4.58	.69	3.95	1.27	1.91
27.	Discipline individual recruits in private.	4.16	1.01	3.16	1,26	2.69*
28.	Have more than two EPOs in one company.	4.32	1.00	3.74	1.15	1.66
29.	Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days.	4.37	. 83	4.32	. 67	.21
30.	Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points.	1.42	.84	1.68	1.06	. 85
<u>31.</u>	Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company.	2.26	1.33	3.11	1.45	1.87
32.	Learn the last name of every member of my company.	4.47	.61	4.11	.99	1.38
						_

[&]quot;+ p <.05



^{**} p< .01

Note: Scale scored l=definitely false, 3=neither true nor false, and 5=definitely true for intending to perform behavior

TABLE 9. MEAN BEHAVIORAL INTENTION FOR THOSE BEHAVIORS ON WHICH TEN OR MORE EXPERIMENTAL INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED FEEDBACK

Behavior	Pretest	<u>:</u>	Post-Training
Trying to be ahead of schedule in teach-ing I.G. lessons	Experimental: Control:	4.21 4.37	1.95 4.21
Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline	Experimental: Control:	2.32 2.37	1.42 2.32
Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority	Experimental: Control:	2.53 1.95	1.79 2.00
Ask other CC to help teach infantry	Experimental: Control:	3.26 3.58	4.05 3.63
Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week	Experimental: Control:	2.84 2.79	1.79 3.05
Allow my EPO to handle most questions after tv classes	Experimental Control:	3.16 3.05	1.89 3.00
Discipline individual recruits in private	Experimental: Control:	3.16 3.05	4.16 3.16
Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company	Experimental: Control:	3.21 3.37	2.26 3.11

Note: Scale scored 1=definitely false, 3=neither true nor false, and 5=definitely true for intending to perform behavior.



ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE RESULTS FOR BEHAVIORAL INTENTION ITEMS ON WHICH TEN OR MORE EXPERIMENTAL INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED FEEDBACK TABLE 10.

E I.G. "Ma 21,99** 4.2 21,99** 4.3 82,80** 4.3	Georgia F 2.13 13.50** 2 10.67** 2	3.43	Teach Infantr WS	2	Ŭ		2.85 2.85 15.33**	H 6	2.76 11.06**	MS F 4.75 2.20 2.16 6.96 8.55 2.22 2.73	NAVTRAEQUIPCEN 74-C-0095-1 10
Teachin lessons lesson	Teaching I.G. The lessons II. II. II. II. III. III. III. III. I	"Marching thru Georgia" # 4.26 2.13 2.00 1 2.00 4.26 13.50** 2.37 10.67** 2.32	Georgia RP0 F KS F 2.13 .64 <1 1.71 13.50** 2.22 3.43 10.67** 2.96 4.57*	Georgia RPO E RPO 2.13 .64 <1 1.71 13.50** 2.22 3.43 10.67** 2.96 4.57*	Georgia" Back up Teach RPO Infinitry E MS F MS F 2.13 .64 <1 .05 <1 1.71 1.13 13.50** 2.22 3.43 3.37 4.84* 10.67** 2.96 4.57* 2.53 3.71 .65 .70	Back up Teach Servic F	Hing Back up Toach Georgia" RPO Infinitry Service Week Georgia" RPO Infinitry Service Week 2.13 .64 <1 .05 <1 6.96 5.34* 1.71 1.13 1.29 13.50** 2.22 3.43 3.37 4.84* 2.96 4.21* 10.67** 2.96 4.57* 2.53 3.71 8.22 11.69** .65 .70 .70	Hong Back up Teach Georgia" RPO Infinitry Service Week Infinitry	Footbase Reck up Teach Service Week TV classes Privation RPO Infinitry Service Week TV classes Privation RPO Infinitry Service Week TV classes Privation RPO Infinitry RPO RPO	Factor Feach Teach Georgia RPO Infinitry Service Week Ty classes Private Private RPO Infinitry Service Week Ty classes Private RPO Infinitry RPO RPO	Factor Feach Teach Georgia Private Discipline Discipline

* p <.05 ** p<.01

EFFECTIVENESS OF EVALUATION CRITERION PROGRAM. The second program involved in training was concerned with the process underlying the evaluation of company commander performance. More specifically the program was designed to allow the CC's to gain a better understanding of the factors (or criteria) that are used in evaluating their performances as CC's. The actual test of the program involves seeing how well the CC can match commands' evaluation of a set of hypothetical CC's described in terms of six criteria. The experimental group performed this task twice within the context of the program; the first time making their own individual judgments and the second time after receiving feedback about how the MTO made the same judgments. For the second set, the individuals were instructed to make their judgments as they thought the MTO would perform the task (role-playing the MTO). The control group without the benefit of the feedback only made the role playing set of judgments. tent of this program (with feedback) was to make the individual user aware of the complexity of the evaluation process and of the self-reported use of the criteria by the MTO.

The results of the data collected within this program were very encouraging; the average correlation between the company commanders' criteria values and those of the MTO within the role playing phase of the program was .692 for the experimental group and .404 for the control group. The difference between these values was significant (t=2.773, df=36, p<.01). This difference indicates that after receiving feedback concerning the MTO's use of the evaluation criteria, the experimental group obtained a closer correspondence in making judgments as the MTO would, than did the control group acting without any feedback. This higher degree of relationship can also be seen in the jump of the average correlation for the experimental group from the pre-training phase (.423) to the post-training role playing phase (.692).

Thus, we again find strong evidence for the effectiveness of PLATO as a training device. It should be emphasized that the difference between the experimental and control groups is not only highly significant, but it was brought about during a relatively brief (less than one-hour) training period. Finally, it is important to note that this particular type of training would be impossible without an interactive device like the PLATO system.

FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURES

At the completion of training his first company, the CC responded to a final self-report questionnaire which, among other things, asked him to indicate whether or not he had performed each of the 32 specific behaviors and assessed his intentions to perform each of these behaviors when leading his next company.

STABILITY OF INTENTIONAL CHANGE. Although it is encouraging to know that intentions to perform specific behaviors can be changed through PLATO training, it is important to determine whether these changes persist over time. In order to answer this question, the 26 CC's who had been assigned to companies were asked to indicate their future intentions to perform each of the 32 specific behaviors after they had completed training their first companies. Approximately nine weeks intervened between the PLATO training and this assessment. Even more important, the CC's interaction with their companies and other CC's may have provided new information that influenced their intentions to perform the 32 behaviors when they led their next companies. Despite this long time



interval and our lack of control over the information CC's received, there is considerable evidence that the effects of PLATO training persisted over time. For each CC, a correlation between his post PLATO training intentions and his intentions to perform these behaviors with his next company was computed. The average correlation (for the set of 32 behaviors) over all 26 CC's was .668 (p<.001). Within the experimental group the average correlation was .734 (p<.001) while it was .608 (p<.001) within the control group. Thus, there is little question that CC intentions are relatively stable over time. More important, after leading their first company, experimental CC's still intend to perform more correct behaviors (25) with their next companies than do control CC's (21). That is, while the average experimental CC intends to correctly perform 78% of the behaviors, the average control CC intends to perform 67% of the correct behaviors.

Finally, it should be noted that even at the level of individual behaviors, differences are found between experimental and control groups. Table 11 presents the mean intentions of the two groups on the final questionnaire. It can be seen that, in contrast to table 3 (where there was only one significant difference) there are five behaviors where the intentions of the two groups differ significantly. More importantly, it can be seen that in all five of these cases, the experimental group has a stronger intention to perform the correct behavior. Indeed, looking at table 11, it can be seen that with respect to 27 of the 32 behaviors, the experimental group has stronger intentions to perform the correct behavior. This finding is highly significant (p < .001), and indicates that experimental CC's who have been exposed to PLATO training are significantly more likely to intend to perform correct behaviors, even after having experience with their first company.

SELF-REPORTS OF BEHAVIOR. Although there seems to be no question that PLATO training is an effective way of changing CC's intentions, and although these changes in intention persist over time, we must still ask the question of whether these intentional changes are reflected in actual behavior. Although there is considerable evidence that intentions are related to behaviors in other areas (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, for a review of this literature), we must obviously ask if this is also the case given these specific CC behaviors. Thus, following graduation of his first company, each CC was asked whether or not he had performed each of the 32 behaviors. (As previously indicated, this data was obtained from 26 CU's; 12 of whom were in the experimental group and 14 of whom were in the control group). For each CC, a correlation between his intentions following PLATO training and his self-reports was computed. The average correlation for the total sample (N=26) was .505 (p <.01) with the average correlation among experimental CC's equalling .548 (n=12, p <.01) and that among control CC's being .470 (n=14, p <.01). These correlations provide evidence that CC's did in fact behave (or at least reported behaving) in accordance with their intentions.

Consistent with this, experimental CC's report performing more correct behaviors (\bar{X} =25.25) than do control CC's (\bar{X} =23.71). That is, on the average, experimental CC's report they have performed the correct behavior 79% of the time and control CC's perform the correct behavior about 74% of the time. Although this difference is not significant, it should be noted that significant differences do exist between the two groups at the level of individual behaviors. Table 12 reports the proportion of experimental and control CC's who indicated they performed each behavior.

⁵See Footnote 2



TABLE 11. MEAN BEHAVIORAL INTENTION RESPONSE ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP

•				
	Exp.	Con- trol		t .
Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	4.58	4.29		.32
Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	6.25	4.93		1,90
Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	5.67	5.14		.61
Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	6.08	4.78		1.62
Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons.	4.67	5.57		1.31
Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	1.08	1.29		1.05
Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	6.75	5.36		2.33
Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	6.50	6.64		.51
To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	6.42	5.50		1.67
Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline.	1.58	1.71		.26
Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	5.25	5.07		.26
Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	2.17	2.36		.32
Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	1.50	1.71		.41
Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	1.83	2.43		.72
Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	1.42	2.21		1.44
	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority. Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade. Precheck lockers prior to an inspection. Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem. Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority. Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade. Precheck lockers prior to an inspection. 6.08 Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. 6.50 To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.42	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem. Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority. Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade. Precheck lockers prior to an inspection. Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1,42 2,21	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem. Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority. Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade. Precheck lockers prior to an inspection. 6.08 4.78 Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. 6.42 5.50 To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.42 2.21

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.



TABLE 11. MEAN BEHAVIORAL INTENTION RESPONSE ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP (cont.)

Control t Exp. Allow my recruit petty officers to give 16. 1.50 1.57 .15 physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline. Back up a recruit petty officer when he has 17. 2.50 3.08 .85 exceeded his authority. Ask other CC to help teach infantry. 18. 5.67 4.50 1.42 Select some recruit officers at R and O. 19. 2.10 5.92 4.50 Leave the company pretty much on its own 20. . 88 3.50 4.14 during service week. Allow my company to use "cheating gear." 21. 2.75 2.07 1.04 Attend most instructor-conducted classes. 22. 4.33 4.14 .26 23. Allow my EPO to handle most questions 4.36 3.75 . 86 after TV classes. Punish my whose company when 3 recruits 24. 2.42 2.36 .09 lose points in locker inspection. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. 25. 1.83 1.57 .60 26. Require my company to study for their academic 1.20 7.00 6.71 tests at least 45 minutes a night. Discipline individual recruits in private. 27. 6.42 5.00 2.47 Have more than two EPOs 28. in one company. 6.75 6.07 1.39 Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days. 6.25 5.07 1.76 29. Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the 30. 2.25 2.36 .14 company points. Discipline a recruit in front of the whole .25 4.58 4.78 31. company. 6,83 6.36 1.36 32. Learn the last name of every member of my company.

Note. Scales scored l=extremely improbable and 7=extremely probable



^{· +} **<.**05

TABLE 12. MEAN SELF-REPORT OF REHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP

		Exp.	Con- trol		t
1.	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	.42	.50		.41
2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	.92	.79		.90
3.	Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	.58	.64		.30
4.	Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	.75	.79		.21
5.	Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons.	.67	.71		.25
6.	Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	.00	.00		.00
7.	Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	1.00	.78		1.74
8.	Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	1.00	1,00		n
9.	To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	. 83	.71		.70
10.	Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline.	.00	.07		.92
11.	Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	.42	.57		.76
12.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	.25	.29		.20
13.	Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	.00	.07		.92
14.	Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	.33	.07		1.72
15.	Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	.08	.07		.11

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.



TABLE 12. MEAN SELF-REPORT OF BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP (cont.) Con-

		Exp.	trol		<u>t</u>
16.	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline.	.08	.00		1.08
17.	Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority.	.42	.36		.30
18.	Ask other CC to help teach infantry.	.92	.79		.90
19.	Select some recruit officers at R and O.	.75	.71		.20
20.	Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.	.17	.36		1.07
21.	Allow my company to use "cheating gear."	.42	.28		.68
22.	Attend most instructor-conducted classes.	.75	.43		1.68*
23.	Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes.	.17	.64		2.68*
24.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection.	.42	.28		.68
25.	Automatically select a setback as my RCPO.	.00	.00		0
26.	Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night.	1.00	1.00		0
27.	Discipline individual recruits in private.	. 83	. 86		.16
28.	Have more than two EPOs in one company.	1.00	.93		.92
29.	Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days.	.92	.71		1.30
30.	Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points.	.08	.21	ı	.90
31.	Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company.	.83	.93		.74
32.	Learn the last name of every member of my company.	1.00	. 86		1.36

p<.05

Note: Scoring was 0=not performed and 1=performed the behavior



The analysis of the self-report of behaviors utilized a one-tail test of significance because of the expected differences in performance of each behavior. Significant differences were obtained with respect to four behaviors. Although a significantly greater proportion of experimental CC's than control CC's report that they told their recruits they didn't believe in "setting back" (an incorrect behavior), experimental CC's were also significantly more likely to ask other CC's to inspect their companies during primary training and to attend most instructor conducted classes. In addition, they were significantly less likely than control CC's to allow their EPO to handle most questions after TV classes. Thus, in three of the four cases where significant differences were obtained, experimental CC's were more likely to perform the correct behavior.

Perhaps even more important, it can be seen in table 12, that on 11 additional behaviors the difference in the proportion of experimental and control CC's who reported performing a behavior exceeded .10, and in eight of these cases the experimental group was most likely to report performing the correct behavior. Thus, of the 15 cases where sizeable differences occurred between the experimental and control groups, more experimental than control CC's report performing the correct behavior in 11 cases. This difference approaches significance (p <.06), and provides evidence that PLATO training was effective in changing company commander behaviors.

RECRUIT PERCEPTION QUESTIONNAIRE

Before reporting the findings based on recruit perceptions, several points must be made. First, it should be recalled that all recruit data were obtained on the 2-5 day of training, while the self-reports of the CC's were obtained after the company graduated. Thus, discrepancies between CC self-reports and recruit perceptions need not imply a lack of validity in either measure. For example, a CC may not have allowed his company to use "cheating gear" until after the 2-5 day. Thus, although his company should report he did not allow the use of cheating gear, the CC himself might have reported that he did allow the use of cheating gear. In this case, the recruit perceptions would not correspond to the CC's self-report, but both would be accurate. In addition to the fact that this problem may arise with respect to many of our behaviors (e.g., one of the behaviors concerned the CC's performance during service week but recruit perceptions were obtained before service week), many of the behaviors occurred more than once. For example, each CC had several opportunities to attend instructor conducted courses. Consider a CC who attended 55% of such classes. Although he might reasonably report that he had attended most instructor conducted classes, it is possible that a majority of his recruits might have reported that he had not attended most instructor conducted classes. That is, the meaning of the word most is somewhat ambiguous and CC's and recruits may have interpreted it differently. Finally, there are some behaviors that the CC may have performed that only a small number of recruits might be aware of (e.g., talking to each setback in private; punishing recruits in private). Thus, although the CC might correctly report he had performed such behaviors, the majority of the recruits in his company may have reported that he had not.

Despite all of these above problems, the self-reports of the CC's were significantly related to the recruits' perceptions. Using the difference between the proportion of recruits saying the CC had and had not performed each behavior



as a criterion (i.e., if more recruits said he had than said he had not, the CC was given credit for performing the behavior), the 32 derived recruit perception scores were correlated with the CC's self-reports. The average correlation (over the 17 CC's for which self-report and recruit perception data were available) was .472 (p<.01). This correlation was .455 (p<.01) among experimental CC's (n=7) and .484 (p<.01) among control CC's (n=10). Correlations were also computed between each CC's intentions following PLATO training and the recruit perceptions. Here too, there was a significant relation between what the CC's intended to do and what the recruits perceived they had done. Over all CC's the average correlation was .467 (p<.01). The average correlation among experimental CC's was .432 (p<.01) while the average correlation among control CC's was .487 (p<.01). Given the problems discussed above, these correlations are remarkably high, and provide strong evidence for the general validity of the CC's self-reports.

Unfortunately however, the recruits did not perceive that experimental CC's performed more correct behaviors than did control CC's. On the average the recruits reported that experimental CC's performed 21.42 correct behaviors while they report that control CC's performed 20.70 correct behaviors. this, they do see some important significant differences when individual behaviors are considered. Table 13 presents the proportion of experimental and control CC's that were perceived to have performed each behavior. As in the case of the correlational analyses described above, a CC was credited with performing a behavior if a greater proportion of recruits in his company said he had than said he had not performed the behavior. It should be noted however, that there were two behaviors where most recruits reported they "did not know" whether or not it had been performed by their CC. Over 83% of the recruits were uncertain about their CC's behavior during service week, and about 65% did not know whether he had private talks with each setback. In addition, in both of these cases, the remainder of the recruits were evenly divided between the "yes" and "no" categories. In marked contrast to this, the average uncertainty with respect to the remaining 30 behaviors was less than 10%, and in only two other cases did it get as high as 30%. These data support the validity of the recruit perceptions.

The analysis of the recruit reports of CC behaviors again utilized a one-tail test of significance because of the expected differences in performance of each behavior. Significant differences were obtained with respect to three behaviors, and in each case, the experimental commanders were seen as significantly more likely to perform the correct behavior. More specifically, the recruits perceived that a significantly greater propostion of experimental than control CC's (1) asked other company commanders for help with a discipline problem, (2) asked other CC's to help teach infantry, and (3) selected some recruit officers at R and O. Although there were 11 other behaviors where recruits did perceive differences between experimental and control CC's (i.e., where the difference in proportion exceeded .10), experimental CC's were perceived as more likely to perform the correct behavior in only five of these cases. Thus, in the 14 cases where differences occurred between the perceptions of recruits in experimental and control companies, experimental commanders were perceived as more likely to perform the correct behavior in eight cases.



TABLE 13. PROPORTION OF COMPANY COMMANDERS PERCEIVED BY RECRUITS TO HAVE PERFORMED EACH BEHAVIOR

	•	Exp.	Contro	01	•
	<u> </u>	N=9	N=11	 .	t
1.	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	.67	.27		1.79
2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	.11			1.13
3.	Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	.78	.91	-	.81
4.	Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	.88	.82		.37
5.	Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons.	.67	.55		.55
6.	Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	.00	.00		
7.	Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	.78	.91		. 81
8.	Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	1.00	1.00		
9.	To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	D.K	D.K.		
10.	Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline.	.22	.28		.31
11.	Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	.00	.09		.92
12.	Punish my whole company wher 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	.33	.18		.7 7
13.	Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	.00	.00		. ==
14.	Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	.00	.00		
15.	Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	.00	.00		
			Ь		•

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.

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TABLE 13. PROPORTION OF COMPANY COMMANDERS PERCEIVED BY RECRUITS TO HAVE PERFORMED EACH BEHAVIOR (cont.) Exp. Control

	HAVE PERFORMED EACH BEHAVIOR (cont.)		Control		
		N=9	N=11		, <u>t</u>
16.	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline.	.78	.46		.46
17.	Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority.	.11	.09		.15
18.	Ask other CC to help teach infantry.	. 89	.45		2.05*
19.	Select some recruit officers at R and O.	.33	.00		2.07*
20.	Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.	D.K.	D.K.		
21.	Allow my company to use "cheating gear."	.33	.09		1.34
22.	Attend most instructor-conducted classes.	.67	.54		.59
23.	Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes.	.67	.73		.29
24.	Punish mv whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection.	.33	.27	·	.29
25.	Automatically select a setback as my RCPO.	.00	.09		.92
26.	Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night.	.78	.64		.68
27.	Discipline individual recruits in private.	.55	.45		44
28.	Have more than two EPOs in one company.	.11	.00		1.13
29.	Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days.	1.00	.91		.92
30.	Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points.	.22	.27		.26
31.	Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company.	1.00	1.00		
32.	Learn the last name of every member of my company.	.78	.91		. 81
_					•

^{*}p <.05

⁺ D.K.=majority of recruits in each company said "don't know".



This difference is not significant. Although the analyses of recruit data do not provide as much support for the effectiveness of PLATO as a behavior change device as the CC's self-reports, it must be recalled that the recruit reports were obtained on the 2-5 day while the self-reports were obtained after the CC's company had graduated. Thus, the recruit reports essentially reflect the CC's behavior during the first two weeks of training while the self-reports cover the entire recruit training period. Despite this, whenever the recruits did report a significant difference between experimental and control CC's, the difference indicated that PLATO trained CC's were more likely to have performed the correct behaviors.

OVERALL EVALUATION OF PLATO AS A BEHAVIOR CHANGE DEVICE

To summarize briefly, the data indicate that PLATO training was a highly effective technique for producing intentional changes among company commanders. Further, PLATO training was effective in producing behavioral changes as indicated by a combination of self-reports and recruit perceptions. Prior to PLATO training, the experimental and control groups were essentially equal -- experimental CC's intended to perform 21.21 correct behaviors while control CC's intended to perform 20.63 correct behaviors. Immediately following PLATO training, a significant increase in the number of correct intentions held by experimental CC's (but not control CC's) was obtained. Thus, following training, experimental CC's intended to correctly perform 26.9 of the 32 behaviors while control CC's still intended to perform 21.47 behaviors correctly. There can be no question that PLATO training can change intentions. This intentional change also appears to carry over into behavior. That is, experimental CC's report performing 25.08 correct behaviors while control CC's only report performing 23.71 correct behaviors. More important, when one considers the proportion of experimental and control CC's who report performing each behavior, there is an overall significant difference indicating that more experimental than control CC's correctly performed the behaviors in question. Unfortunately, the data based on recruit perceptions do not completely support these findings. This difference between the selfreports and recruit perceptions may be due to various factors, not the least of which is the fact that recruit perceptions were obtained on the 2-5 day while the CC reports were obtained after their companies had graduated. The recruits perceive experimental CC's as performing 21.43 correct behaviors and control CC's as performing 20.7 correct behaviors. Although the recruits did not perceive any significant overall differences between experimental and control CC's, they did perceive significant differences with respect to three behaviors, and in each case, the PLATO trained CC's were more likely to have performed the correct behaviors. Finally, and also of importance, it should be noted that even after leading their first companies, experimental CC's still intend to perform significantly more correct behaviors than do control CC's. More specifically, on the final questionnaire, the experimental CC's intended to perform 25.08 correct behaviors while control CC's only intended to perform 21.42 correct behaviors.

Thus, PLATO training increased the number of correct intentions of experimental CC's; these intentions were reflected in their self-reports of behavior, and persisted over time. In contrast, control CC's held the same number of correct intentions pre- and post-PLATO training, report performing slightly more correct behaviors than they intended to perform, but show no improvement in their intentions to perform correct behaviors with their next company. Generally speaking, CC's do report performing the behaviors they intended to perform



 $(\bar{r}=.505)$ and the recruit reports provide validity for the self-reports $(\bar{r}=.472)$. Although CC's intentions clearly persist over time $(\bar{r}=.668)$, their future intentions are most strongly influenced by their past behavior $(\bar{r}=.780)$.

Experimental CC's are somewhat more likely to report behaving in accordance with their intentions (r=.548) than are control CC's $(\bar{r}=.470)$, and consistent with this, their intentions are somewhat more stable (r=.734) than are those of the control CC's (r=.608). Thus, experimental CC's are more likely to do what they intended to do, and having done it, intend to continue performing that way in the future (r=.772). Control CC's on the other hand, seem to learn that some of their intentions were incorrect, and behave somewhat differently than they originally intended. Here too, however, they intend to behave in the future as they had in the past (r=.787). Experimental CC's seem to learn the correct thing to do, they tend to act on those intentions and it would appear that they are reinforced for their actions since they intend to continue performing that way in the future. Control CC's start with fewer correct intentions. Although they, too, seem to act in accordance with those intentions, it would appear that they are negatively reinforced for some of their incorrect intentions. That is, it appears that they start acting in contrast to some of their initial intentions, which seems to have the function of increasing the number of correct behaviors they report performing. Although they do tend to bring their intentions into line with their behaviors, they still intend to perform more incorrect behaviors than experimental CC's. Thus, PLATO training not only provides the experimental CC's with the right intentions initially, but these correct intentions persist over time. Even after practical experience, the non-PLATO trained CC's do not appear to catch up with the experimental group. On the basis of these findings it seems clear that PLATO is an effective behavior change technique.

SECTION IV

ADDITIONAL MEASURES OF BEHAVIORAL CHANGE EFFECTS

Thus far, this report has focused on the main task of the contract -namely demonstrating that PLATO can serve as an effective behavior change
device. Perhaps a more important question, however, is "what are the effects
of producing these behavioral changes?" That is, do experimental company
commanders who have received PLATO training have higher morale, more favorable
attitudes toward the navy, or different recruit training philosophies than
control CC's. Similarly, do the differences in their behaviors also influence
the satisfaction, morale, or performance of the recruits in their companies.

TRADITIONAL ATTITUDES. The final self-report questionnaire reassessed the CC's attitudes towards various concepts related to their jobs (e.g., being a CC, today's navy). In looking at the comparison of experimental and control groups on these traditional attitudes, no significant differences were found. The means and standard deviations for these items are presented in table 14.



TABLE 14. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR TRADITIONAL ATTITUDE MEASURES ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE

	Experi	ental	Cont	rol	t
Attitude Concept	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Being a CC	41.67	6.02	40.36	4.50	0.63
Trying to Brigade	39.83	8.04	34.50	11.40	1.35
Pushing a Company	39.50	8.46	38.71	5.59	0.28
Today's Navy	38.92	6.87	33.57	8.58	1.73
New Recruits	36.08	7.04	32.50	4.78	1.54

Note: Mean is sum of 7 bipolar items each scored l=negative, 4=neutral, and 7=positive aspect.

COMPANY COMMANDER SATISFACTION AND TRAINING PHILOSOPHIES. Fifty items dealing with satisfaction of being a company commander and training philosophy were also included on the final questionnaire. (See appendix D). For each item, the mean responses of experimental and control CC's were compared; no significant differences were found on any of the 50 items.

FEEDER EVALUATIONS. During the training period, each company commander was evaluated twice, once on the primary side and once on the advanced side. These evaluations were performed by the regimental officers who worked with the CC during the company's training on a day-by-day basis. Due to a change in command policy, only the first 13 categories were used for these evaluations instead of the complete set of 20 as used on the feeder evaluations upon graduation from CC school. None of the categories differentiated the experimental and control group on either of the two measures.

RECRUIT SATISFACTION AND MORALE. In addition to containing questions concerning CC behavioral performance, the recruit perception questionnaire also contained questions assessing the recruits' feelings about their company and their company commander. For each company, the mean response for each item was calculated and these mean responses were averaged for the experimental-control groups' comparison. No differences between companies led by experimental CC's and those led by the control group CC's were found. Table 15 shows the relevant data for this analysis.

TABLE 15. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF RECRUIT PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR COMPANY AND OF THEIR COMPANY COMMANDER

Item	Experi	mental	Cont	<u>rol</u>	t	
	Mean		Mean	SD		
Company Rating	3.18	0.71	2.98	0.61	0.69	
CC Rating ^b	5.30	0.82	5.56	0.70	0.79	
CC Interest in Recruits	1.70	0.29	1.76	0.41	0.33	
Respect for CC	1.95	0.51	1.97	0.58	0.09	

^{*}Scales scored 1=positive and 7=negative response

ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE SCORES. During the course of training, each company was evaluated for a four week period on various criteria by the MED staff. These measures are of company performance on the different aspects of training. The two measures looked at were the overall averages of the competition performance of each company and the number of streetmarks obtained by the company within the four week period. Neither of these measures showed significant differences between the experimental and the control group. See table 16 for the individual data.

To summarize, no differences were found between experimental and control CC's on a large variety of satisfaction and philosophy questions. Similarly, recruits in companies led by experimental CC's were no more satisfied, nor did they perform better than recruits in companies led by control CC's. While these results may appear discouraging, they are in fact, not unexpected.

It must be recalled that none of the behaviors we attempted to change were ever tied directly into measures of satisfaction, morale or performance. As we tried to point out at the beginning of this project, we were never in doubt that PLATO could effectively change behavior, but we also felt that one must first identify behaviors that were known to be relevant to various criteria. Our task was to show that PLATO training could change CC's behavior, and we feel that we have satisfactorily completed that task. Knowing that PLATO can be used to change behavior, the more important question becomes, what behaviors should be changed if one wishes to improve recruit performance? Or, what behaviors should be changed if one wants to improve recruit morale? Or, what behaviors should be changed if one wants to improve CC satisfaction, or the scores that CC's receive when they are evaluated? It should be made clear that different behaviors may be relevant to each of these criteria and, in fact, it



bScale scored 1=negative and 7=positive response

CScale scored 1=positive and 4=negative response

TABLE 16. COMPANY PERFORMANCE DATA FOR OVERALL AVERAGE AND STREETMARKS

	Experimental			Cont	Control			
Company	Average	Z-Score	Streetmark	Average	Z-Score	Streetmark		
1 .	3.527ª	-0.311 ^b	1	3.573	-0.141	0		
2	3.427	0.459	2	3.544	-0.398	6		
3	3.523	-0.363	1	3.515	-0.467	2		
4	3.493	0.938	4	3.401	-0.243	1		
5	3.315	-1.442	7	3.344	-1.353	3		
6	3.364	-1.362	2	3.411	-0.431	14		
7	3.445	-0.869	1	3.429	-0.241	O .		
8	3.470	0.217	2	3.446	-0.826	1		
9	3.440	-0.739	. 0	3.458	-1.222	3		
10	3.645	1.043	1	3.591	1.240	0		
11	3.545	-0.574	6	3.371	-1.528	10 ′		
12	3.418	-1.277	0	3,438	-0.758	5		
13	3.526	-0.045	. 6	3.523	0.218	0		
14			•••	3.359	-1.300	10		
Mean	3.465	-0.332	2.54	3.457	-0.532	3.93		
. s.d.	0.082	0.827	2.40	0.079	0.730	4.51		

^aMaximum possible score is 4.000



bTransformed score within training group. Minus values indicate below group mean, positive values above the group mean.

is possible that getting a CC to perform a particular behavior may increase recruits' morale while lowering the CC's satisfaction. Just because it is assumed that a given behavior is "correct" or that a given behavior should be performed, this does not mean that performance of that behavior will have an influence on other criteria. Although one obviously hopes that this will be the case, it is an empirical question that must be studied independently. In this particular study, we tried to increase the likelihood that experimental CC's would perform 32 behaviors that the RTC staff thought were important. That is, the assumption was made that these were not only the "correct" behaviors to perform, but that their performance would in fact lead to increased satisfaction, morale, or performance on other criteria. While we cannot at this time say that these assumptions were incorrect, we can report that although experimental CC's were in fact more likely to perform many of these behaviors than control CC's, and although recruits perceived that experimental CC's performed more of these behaviors than did control CC's, we find absolutely no differences between experimental and control groups on over 120 criteria. In part, this problem may be similar to the problem of analyzing single behaviors. Although more of the experimental CC's than control CC's may have performed a given behavior, the actual proportion of performers within each group may not have been significantly different. Thus, it is possible that if a comparison were made between commanders who did or did not perform a given behavior, or between recruits who report that their commander did or did not perform a given behavior, some of these behaviors may, in fact, be found to be related to various criteria. Since these analyses go beyond the specifications of the present contract, we shall discuss them in a supplemental report.

SECTION V

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the evidence cited above, we can conclude that PLATO is a highly effective device for producing intentional change and is also effective in producing behavioral change. In addition, it has many other potential uses. For example, it was also highly effective in providing CC's insight into the process and criteria used to evaluate their performances.

Of the utmost importance, however, it must be realized that the effectiveness of PLATO as a training device is critically dependent upon the software — i.e., on the particular programs that are written. We believe that our approach to behavioral change training was effective because the programs were based on a sound psychological theory that had been shown to be valid in a variety of behavioral areas. We strongly believe that if we had taken a traditional approach to the attitude-behavior problem, PLATO training would not have been successful. That is, we doubt if any of the specified intentions or behaviors would have shown change if our program had been directed at increasing or changing CC's attitudes toward various aspects of the navy, their satisfaction with the navy or their jobs as CC's or their recruit training philosophies. We feel that we were successful because we assumed each intention was a function of the person's attitude toward performing the behavior in question and/or his subjective norm concerning that behavior. Thus, our program was directed at changing these attitudes and subjective norms. Appendices J and K demonstrate the effectiveness of PLATO at



this level and the results concerning intentional and behavioral change clearly indicate the validity of our approach. The predictive model of behavioral intentions is based on derived empirical regression weights and not on mean differences between samples. Appendices J and K indicate that some differences in evaluation of the behaviors and perception of normative beliefs for the MTO exist between the experimental and control groups. These differences were on the final questionnaire assessment. It should be recalled that no differences on these same measures were found on the pretest questionnaire.

Despite the fact that the entire training session took less than two hours, the intentional changes produced by PLATO were large and persistent. This finding is encouraging and is in agreement with Rokeach's (1975) findings concerning the long term effectiveness of computer based changes in values. Since the programs written depended very heavily on the interactive nature of a computer based teaching machine, we feel it would have been almost impossible to efficiently provide the types of information we did in a different manner. Although the behavioral changes could probably have been produced without a device such as PLATO, it would have required individual sessions with each CC. or if a group approach was to be used, every CC would have to be trained on every behavior. The first alternative is more costly in terms of personnel and time; the second not only takes more time but also has the disadvantage of requiring respondents to continually go over material that is irrelevant. This will greatly lower the effectiveness of the relevant material. More important, there are certain training techniques that require a computer based instructional system. It would have been impossible to provide the instantaneous feedback utilized in the evaluation training program without a system involving an on-line computer.

The PLATO system itself is highly recommended for future use. The graphics capability of PLATO make the system uniquely suited for presenting all types of material. Programming on the system is relatively easy and this allows for corrections and revisions of existing materials to be made on the spot. For example, the evaluation training program is based, in part, on the relative weights the MTO places on the various criteria. There was a change in MTO's after programming had been completed but prior to training our first CC's. With the flexibility afforded by the PLATO system it was possible for us to quickly revise the program to include the weights of the new MTO. In addition, the new MTO suggested some last minute changes in the wording of some of the intentional items comprising the behavior change program. Here too, we were able to quickly revise the program. Even though the terminals in San Diego were 2,000 miles from the computer itself, the system proved to be highly reliable and stable in performance. Thus, although other computer assisted systems may also be effective for behavioral change training we feel the use of the PLATO system greatly facilitated training.

The use of a computer assisted system can be justified on other grounds as well. The comments of the individuals who participated in the study were favorable concerning their interaction with PLATO. These individuals had some reservations concerning the usefulness of the training before participation but were



Rokeach, M. Long-term value change initiated by computer feedback. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 467-476.

impressed and appreciative of the opportunity to interact with the computer system. Although it is outside the scope of the present contract, it should be noted that much of the material presented in the classroom at CC school could be presented on the PLATO system. The testing and grading operations could also be delegated to a computer system. This type of instruction would also benefit the individual company commander in that learning could take place at his own pace and that he could avoid the embarrassment of "holding back" the class if he was having difficulty comprehending some of the material. However, PLATO should not be viewed as a replacement for the instructor in CC school, but as a supplemental tool which would free the instructor to perform other tasks within the training (e.g., more drill time).

The availability of a computer assisted system would also make possible a review source for the CC to reacquaint himself with certain information. This procedure would also increase the effectiveness of such a system in that the individual could continually be aware of information important for his performance. Repeated opportunities to view such information would make for a more effective behavioral change technique.

Work should also be undertaken to assess the relationship between behavioral performance and behavioral effectiveness on certain criteria. PLATO is effective in changing intentions to perform specific behaviors but these behaviors should be related to criterion performance. Also, one should not assume PLATO or any other computer system to automatically be effective change techniques. The system is only as effective as the software written for it. The computer programs must be relevant to the intended purpose of the training and validated before their use.



1.	Age	-	
2.	Rate	Rating	
3.	Number of	years in the Navy	
4.	Which sta	ate did you grow up in?	
	For the	following questions, answer by checking th	e appropriate letter
5.	What is t	the population of your hometown?	·
		Less than 1,000	
	B. 1	l,001 to 5,000	
		3,001 to 20,000	·
		0,001 to 50,000	
		0,001 to 100,000	
	P.100	0,001 to 500,000	
	G. N	More than 500,000	
5.	What is y	our educational level?	
	A. G	Grammar school only	
	B. S	Some high school	
	с. н	ligh school graduate	
	D. J	Junion college graduate	
	E. s	Some college	
		College graduate	
7.		your marital status?	
		have never been married	•
		am married	
		am divorced and not remarried	
		am legally separated	
	B. I	am a widower	
B.		re married answer this question, otherwise	
		your wife feel about your being in the Navy	
		the is happy that I am in the Navy and proud	d that I have chosen
	1	t as a career	•
	B. S	the is happy I am in the Navy and would be p	proud if I did choose
	_	t as a career	
	c. s	the has no strong feelings about my being in	n the Navv
	D. s	he is satisfied that I am in the Navy now I	
	D. s		



45 _

9.	What was the single most important reason why you initially joined the Navy? A. Career opportunities looked better than in civilian life B. For travel, adventure, new experience C. Opportunity for advanced education, professional, or technical skills D. Wanted to fulfill my military obligation at a time and in the service of my choice rather than be drafted E. Wanted to serve my country F. Interest in the sea, and/or shipboard life G. Interest in flying or astronautics H. For a position with responsibility and dignity I. For a secure position with promotions and favorable retirement benefits J. Some other reason: State your reason here
10.	What are your current service plans?
	I am not eligible for retirement now and:
	A. Plan to leave active duty as soon as possible
	B. Undecided about re-enlisting in the Navy
	C. Plan to re-enlist but not sure about staying until retirement
	D. Plan to stay until retirement
	I am eligible for retirement now and:
	E. Plan to retire with 20 years or less of active service (counting
	constructive time)
	F. Plan to retire with more than 20 years but less than 30 years of active service
	G. Plan to retire with 30 or more years of active service (if authorized)
	H. Undecided as to when I wish to retire
11.	If you are a career Petty Officer, or plan to be, what were the reasons for
	your decision? State the one most important reason for your decision.
	A. Limited opportunity to use my skills and abilities in a vocation of
	my choice in the civilian community
	B. Job security C. Promotion opportunity
	D. Retirement benefits and the opportunity to retire after 20 years
	of service
	E. Pay, allowances and fringe benefits (medical, commissaries and
	exchanges, etc.)
	F. Opportunity to travel, including PCS (accompanied tour) in various
	national and international locations
	G. Opportunity for interesting and challenging assignments
	H. Belonging to an organization I can be proud of
	I. Opportunity for additional technical training
	J. Other reason: State your reason here.
	Now do named an accordant to the Name company with those in civilian life
12.	How do career opportunities in the Navy compare with those in civilian life, considering all factors which are important to you in choosing a career?
	A. Career opportunities in the Navy are better than in civilian life
•	B. Career opportunities in the Navy are the same as in civilian life
	C. Career opportunities in the Navy are worse than in civilian life
	D. No opinion

ERIC

Full Text Provided by ERIC

13.	Where would you prefer to live?
	A. Among military people on-base
	B. Among military prople off-base
	C. In the civilian community
	D. Makes no difference where I live
14.	The state of the s
	wavy:
	A. Intended to make the Navy my career
	B. Was undecided and was waiting to see how well I would like the
	navy
	C. Hadn't thought about it
	D. Intended to fulfill my military obligation(s) only
15.	
	changes would do the most to make Naval service more attractive to you
	as a career?
	A. Expand opportunity to use off-duty education programs (Tuition
	Aid, PACE, ASAFI, In-Service-GI Bill, etc.)
	B. Improve living conditions aboard ship
	C. Less frequent permanent change of station (PCS) moves
	D. Authorize quarters allowance for backelors, both askers
	2. Shorten tours of sea duty
	F. Provide adequate BEQs (enlisted barracks) and family housing, or
	increase housing allowances where adequate government housing
	cannot be provided
	G. Make pay, allowances, and retirement equity equal to Civil
	Service or industry
	n. improve leadership and supervision
	I. Give enlisted men more influence on choice of geographical least a
	J. Provide sea pay (\$15 to \$115) based on cumulative years (2 to 10
	years, or sea duty
•	K. Other change: State the change here
16	What is now marked to
	What is your present pay grade?
	A. E-5
	B. E-6
	C. E-7
	D. E-8
	E. E-9
17.	What is your present enlistment and/or extension status?
	A. First enlistment
	B. Extension of first enlistment
	C. Second enlistment
	D. Extension of second enlistment
	E. Third or later enlistment or extension
8.	
	Do you have a full or part-time civilian job after duty hours? A. No, have no desire to
	B. No, but would like to
	C. Yes primarily in and a second
	C. Yes, primarily in order to make ends meet D. Yes, for various other reasons
	vallus uludr reasone



19.	My s	hore duty assignment as a company commander was:
	A.	A voluntary require
•	в.	The better alternative from the choices offered to me
_	c.	The only reasonable assignment offered
	·D.	I was ordered to this assignment



On	the next	two pa	ages we	are g	oing t	o ask	you to	rate certai	n.
aspects	of your	job on	scales	with	seven :	interv	als su	ch as:	
	good	_:		_:			_ :	_: bad	
	easy	:		_:		:		: difficult	
The sev	en interv	als sho	ould be	inter	preted	as fo	llows:		٠
EASY	:	:		:	:	:	. :	DI extremely	FF ICULT
	Please p	lace yo	our che	ckmark	in the	e inte	rval t	hat best des	cribes
your op:								"Being stat	
San Die	go," and	you tho	ught i	t was	quite (good a	nd sli	ght!y diffic	ult then
	uld place								
		BEING	STATIO	ONED I	n san 1	DIEGO			
	good	:_X	_ :	.	:	:	:	: bad	
								_: difficult	
	In makin	g your	ratings	s plea:	se reme	ember	the fo	llowing poin	ts:
1)	Place y boundar	our che ^{ieş} his	ckmarks		he <u>midd</u> this	ile of	space	s, not on the	e
		: X	_						
2)	Be sure	you fi	ll out	every	questi	on on	the pa	age - do not	omit any.
3)	Never p	ut more	than c	ne che	ckmark	on a	single	scale.	



BEING A COMPANY COMMANDER

Good	:		_:	:	:	:	: Bad
							: Foolish
Beneficial							
							: Punishing
							:Unpleasant
							:Unintelligent
							:Not satisfying
							Difficult
·				TO BR			
Good	·	:	:	:_	:	_:_	: Bad
							: Foolish
Beneficial							
							: Punishing
							: Unpleasant
							: Unintelligent
							: Difficult
•							
			PUSHIN	G A COL			
Good	:	:	:	:_	:_	:	: Bad
Wise	:_	:_	·		<u> </u>	:_	: Foolish
							: Harmful
							: Punishing
							: Unpleasant
Intelligent		:		:	:_	:_	: Unintelligent
Satisfying	` :		:	:	:_	:	: Not Satisfying
Feev		' :				:	: Difficult
/							



CODAY'S NAVY

Good : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :									
Rewarding : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Good	:	:_	:	:-	:_	:_	:	Bad
Rewarding : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Wise			:	:	_:_	:_	:	Foolish
Pleasant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Beneficial		:		:		:_	:	Harmful
Intelligent : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Rewarding		:	:	:	:_	:	:	Punishing
Satisfying : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Pleasant				_:	:_	:_	:	Unpleasant
Basy : : : : : : : : : : : : : Difficult NEW RECRUITS Good : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Intelligent	:	:	_:_	_:_	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	:_	:	Unintelligent
NEW RECRUITS Good : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Satisfying	:	:	 :	:		:	:	Not satisfying
Good : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Basy	·:	:	:		:_	:_	:	Difficult
Wise : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :									
Beneficial : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :				new	RECRU	JITS			
Rewarding : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Good						:	<u></u> :	Bed
Pleasant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :				:	:	:			
Intelligent ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::	Wise		:	_:_		_:_ _:_	_:	_:	Foolish
	Wise Beneficial	:		_ : _ :		_:_		: :	Foolish Harmful
	Wise Beneficial Rewarding			_ : _ : _ :		_:_		_:	Foolish Harmful Punishing
Satisfying :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	Wise Beneficial Rewarding Pleasant							: :	Foolish Harmful Punishing Unpleasant



The next thing we want to	know is	s whether	you pers	onally f	eel that	ı
performing each of the stated h	ehavio:	rs 1 9 good	d or bad.	Once a	gain, we	į
will use a seven interval scale	where	the inter	rvals sho	uld be i	nterpret	.ed .
as follows:						
Good extremely quite slightly	neith	er slight	ly quite	extremel	_: Bad y	
Thus, for example, if you					behavi or	· x
is extremely good, you should p	place y	our check	mark as I	ollows:		
Deviceming behavior X is Good	х:	:	: :	:	:	Bad



1.	Asking other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems is
2.	Immediately firing a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority is good : : : : : : : : : bad
3.	Automatically selecting a "setback" as my R.C.P.O. is good : : : : : : : bad
4.	Telling my company that I expect them to shoot for brigade is good _:_:_:_:_: : bad
5.	Taking away phone privileges as a form of discipline is good : : : : : : : bad
6.	Pre-checking all lockers prior to inspection is good _:_: : : : : : : bad
7.	Being ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons is good:_:_:_: bad
8.	Allowing other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training is good:_:_:_: bad
9.	Asking other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training is good:::: bad
	Selecting the toughest-looking recruit for my master-at-arms is good:::: bad
	Attending all smokers where one of my recruits is fighting is
	Using "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline is good:::: bad
13.	Punishing the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection is good:_:_:_:_: bad
14.	Punishing the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection is good:_:_:_:_: bad
15.	Telling the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline is good::: bad
	Telling my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back" is
	Faking a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company is
18.	Allowing my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline is good:_:_:_: bad
	Backing up a recruit petty officer when he exceeds his authority is
	Asking other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry is good:::_ bad
21.	Selecting some recruit officers at R and O is good : : : : : : bad



22.	Using Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge" is good:::: bad
23.	Allowing my company to use "cheating gear" is
24.	good : : : : : : : : bad Attending most instructor-conducted classes is
25.	Allowing my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes is good:::: bad
26.	
27,	Being out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge" is good : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :
28.	Requiring my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night is
29.	Being in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge" is good ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
3 0.	Having more than 2 E.P.O.'s in one company is good : : : : : : : : : : : bad
31.	Pre-inspecting my company on evaluation days is good : : : : : : : : bad
32.	Telling my company that brigading is not important is
•	Trying to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points is good::: bad
	Disciplining recruits in front of the whole company is
	Learning the last names of every member of my company is
	Giving out demerits as a form of discipline is good : : : : : : : : bad
37 .	Leaving the company pretty much on its own during service week is
38.	Disciplining individual recruits in private is good:::: bad
39.	Having a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each "setback" is good : : : : : : : : : bad
40.	Telling my company to come to me with all their personal problems is



We would now like to know whether you believe that certain other people think you should or should not perform each behavior. Once, again, seven place scales will be used, and the intervals should be intrepreted as follows:

I	should		: .	:	:	:	•	•	¥	ahau1d
		extremely	quite	slightly	don't	slightly	qui te	extremely		not
		Certain	certain	certain	know	certain	certain	Certain		

For example, you might be asked if "Most Battalion Commanders" think you should perform behavior X. If you are extremely certain that "most battalion commanders" think you should not perform behavior X, then you would place your checkmark as follows:

				Most	Bat	tali	on	Co	mm	anders	Thi	nk	4	
ľ	should _	 <u></u>	:	<u></u>		<u></u>	:_3	<u>.</u>	I	should	not	perform	behavior	x.





Most other Company Commanders I respect think

1.	I should : : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems
2.	I should : : : : : I should not immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority
3.	I should : : : : : I should not automatically select a "setback" as my R.C.P.O.
4.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my company that I expect them to shoot for brigads
5.	I should : : : : : I should not take away phone privileges as a form of discipline
6.	I should : : : : : I should not pre-check all lockers prior to inspection
7.	I should : : : : : : : I should not be ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons
8.	I should : : : : : I should not allow recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves
9.	I should : : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training
10.	looking recruit for my master-at-arms
11.	I should : : : : : I should not attend all smokers where one of my recruits is fighting
12.	Georgia" as a form of discipline
13.	company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection
14.	company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection
	I should : : : : : I should not tell the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline
	. I should : : : : : : I should not tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back"
	I should : : : : : I should not fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company
18.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline
19.	I should : : : : : I should not back up a recruit petty officer when he exceeds his authority
20.	I should : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry
21.	I should : : : : : I should not select some recruit officers at R and O



Most other Company Commanders I respect think

22.	I should : : : : : I should not use Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"
23.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my company to use "cheating gear"
24.	I should : : : : : : I should not attend most instructor conducted classes
25.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes
26.	I should : : : : : I should not set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems
27.	I should : : : : : I should not be out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"
28.	I should : : : : : I should not require my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night
29.	I should : : : : : I should not be in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"
30.	I should : : : : : : I should not have more than 2 E.P.O.'s in one company
31.	I should : : : : : I should not pre-inspect my company on evaluation days
32.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my company that brigading is not important
33 .	I should : : : : : I should not try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points
34.	I should : : : : : I should not discipline recruits in front of the whole company
35.	I should : : : : : : I should not learn the last names of every member of my company
36.	I should : : : : : I should not give out demerits as a form of discipline
37 .	I should : : : : : I should not leave the company pretty much on its own during service week
3 8.	I should : : : : : I should not discipline individual recruits in private
3 9.	I should : : : : : I should not have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback
40.	I should : : : : : : I should not tell my company to



COMPANY COMMANDER/SUPPORT BILLET EVALUATION CPO/PETTY OFFICER
11ND-NTC-1616-9 (REV. 6-70) CPO SECTION NAME (Lost, first and inches RE CIME NT DIVISION ONE TWO SERVICE NUMBER CO. N' MEER DATE REPORTED TO REC RATEE HAS LED _____ COMPANIES INCLUDING THIS COMPANY DATE OF PICK-UP COMPANY DEPARTURE DATE COMPANY SIZE SUPPORT BILLET INFORMATION DESCRIPTION OF BILLET TASKS PERIOD OF EVALUATION COMMENTS DATE ASSIGNED **EVALUATION** THE TYPICAL OUTSTANDING CHIEF OF RATEE'S RATE Compare rates with all others of his rate known to you. Mark only the smallest top or bottom percentage which applies. BOTTOM TOP 50% Sne: 30% 10% 10% *Any mark in top/bottom 10.5 or 1% requires individual justification in 5% . mment Section. 1% NOT OBSERVED A. PERFORMANCE OF DUTY B. ENDURANCE C. PERSONAL APPEARANCE D. COOPERATIVENESS E. RELIABILITY F. INITIATIVE G. CONDUCT H. POTENTIAL I, RESOURCEFULNESS DIRECTING LEADERSHIP .. COUNSELING L. VERBAL WRITING M. EXPRESSION SPEAKING OTHER FACTORS FOR C/C N. CO. ORGANIZATION O. CO. DISCIPLINE P. INFANTRY EVAL. Q. BAG EVAL. R. ACADEMIC EVAL. S. ADMINISTRATIVE T. OVERALL EVALUATION BATTALION DIVISION UP FICER 5 SIGNATURE AND RANGE REGIMENTAL COMMISSION SIGNATURE AND WANK DATE RE-EVALUATE CONCUR



CONCUR

RE-EVALUATE

(IAII

GNATURE AND HANK

RECRUIT SURVEY

San Diego, California 1975

University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois

This survey is being conducted as part of a research project concerned with recruit training. Please answer the questions that follow we honestly as you can. The results will be used for research purposes only, and will not be used for any official rating of you, your company, or your Company Commander. Your Company Commander will not see your answers; the only people to see the answers will be the research team at the University of Illinois.



Please fil	l in the information requested:
Company Nu	mber Company Commander's Name
Today's Da	te Day of Training
	DDOG Voc Voc
	RPO? Yes No es, which? RCPO RPOL MAA AMAA YN Squad Leader
Right	Guide Guidon Bearer EPC APO LPO
Are you ma	arried? Yes No
•	tion to the second seco
_	
Age	
•	
•	
•	
Please at	DEWET the Callowing by simplify the state of
	nswer the following by circling the choice which you feel best
answere	the question:
. What is y	your educational level?
	grammar school only
	some high school
	high school graduate
	some college
(e)	college graduate
Why did v	you join the Navy? Pick only one answer, the most important one.
(a)	for travel and adventure
(b)	for educational opportunities
(c)	wanted to serve my country
	wanted a secure job
(1)	couldn't find a good civilian job
I think m	my company is:
(a)	definitely the best at RTC
(p)	one of the best at RTC
(c)	an above average company at RTC
(d)	an average company at RTC
(e)	a below average company at RTC
(1)	one of the worst at RTC
(g)	definitely the worst _t RTC



Compared to the other company commanders, I think my CC is:

- (a) dofinitely the worst CC at RTC
- (b) one of the worst CC
- (c) a below average CC
- (d) an average CC
- (e) an above average CC
- (f) one of the best CC
- (g) definitely the best CC at RTC

I think the morale of my company is:

- (a) extremely good
- (b) very good
- (c) good
- (d) fair
- (e) bad
- (1) very bad
- (g) extremely bad

Does your company commander show an interest in his recruits and their problems?

- (a) snows definite interest in his recruits and their problems
- (b) shows somewhat of an interest in his recruits and their problems
- (c) shows slight interest in his recruits and their problems
- (d) shows no interest in his recruits and their problems

How do you feel about your company commander?


- (a) I have great respect for him
- (b) I have respect for him
- (c) I have slight respect for him
- (d) I neither respect nor fear him
- (e) I have a slight fear of him
- (?) I have a fear of him
- (g) I have a great fear of him



We would like to know if your company commander performed certain behaviors. For each behavior, place a check mark in the appropriate column for your answer.

Did your company commander. . .

- ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem
- immediately fire a RPO who exceeded his authority
- 3. tell the company that he expected the company to shoot for brigade
- 4. pre-check lockers prior to an inspection
- 5. try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons
- 6. allow recruits to finish fights they started among themselves
- 7. ask other company commanders to inspect the company during primary training
- 8. give out demerits as a form of ciscipline
- 9. have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback
- use "Marching through Georgia" is a form of discipline
- 11: set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems
- 12. punish the whole company when 3 recruits lost points in personal inspection
- 13. tell the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline
- 14. tell the company that he didn't believe in setting back recruits
- 15. fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company
- 16. allow the RPD's to give physical training (such as push ups) as a form of discipline
- 17. back up a RPO who exceeded his authority
- 18. ask other comrany commanders to help him teach infantry
- 19. select some 3PO at R and O
- 20. leave the company pretty much on its own during service week
- 21. allow the company to use cheating gear
- 22. attend most instructor conducted classes
- 23. let the FFO handle most questions after TV classes
- 24. punish the whole company when 3 recruits lost points in locker inspection
- 25. select : setback as the RCPO





Did your company commander ...

- 26. require the company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night
- 27. discipline recruits in private
- 28. have more than two EPO's in the company
- 29. pre-inspect the company on evaluation days
- 30. try to hide a recruit who might cost the company points
- 31. discipline a recruit in front of the whole company
- 32. learn the last name of every member of the company

<u>Yes</u>	No	Don't Know
•		
		·
· -		



DIRECTIONS: Think of your company commander. How well does each of the following words describe him?

Circle YES if it describes your company commander.

Circle NO if it does NOT describe your company commander.


Circle ? if you cannot decide.

MY COMPANY COMMANDER


Asks my advice	YES	NO	?
Hard to please	YES	NO	?
Impolite	YES	NO	?
Praises good work	YES	NO	?
Tactful	YĖS	NO	?
Influential	YES	МО	?
Up-to-date	YES	NO	?
Doesn't supervise enough	YES	NO	. ?
Quick-tempered	YES	NO	?
Tells me where I stand	YES	NO ,	?
Annoying	YES	МО	?
Stubborn	YES	NO	?
Knows job well	YES	NO	?
Bad	YES	NO	?
Intelligent	YES	NO	?
Leaves me on my own	YES	ио́	?
Around when needed	YES	МО	?
Lazy	YES	NO	?



Flace an X in the circle under the face that best expresses how you feel about recruit training in general, including all the aspects of your training.




Place an X in the circle under the face that best expresses how you feel about your Company Commander.





Place an X in the circle under the face that best expresses how you feel about your, company.



Place an X in the circle under the face that best expresses how you feel about the morale of your company.





University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY . CHAMPAIGN, ILLINOIS 61820

Company Commander
Recruit Training Command
Naval Training Center
San Diego, California 92133

Dear Company Commander

I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you for your cooperation and participation in this research project. Needless to say, the project could not have been undertaken without your help and willingness to participate.

This is the final questionnaire that we will ask you to complete for this project. It is very similar to the questionnaire which you completed in earlier times.

Along with this questionnaire you should have received a pre-addressed envelope. After completing the questionnaire, you should insert it into the envelope and seal it; this procedure is being undertaken to ensure the confidentiality of your responses. Please return the sealed envelope to LCDR Hearn's office so that he can keep a record of the individuals who have completed the questionnaire. He will then mail all the completed questionnaires to me at the University of Illinois.

Please be sure that you follow the instructions for each section and answer each of the questions.

If you would like any further information on this project, please feel free to contact me at the University of Illinois. Again let me thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Jerry L. Cohen Assistant Professor

JLC:vv



Name:	


Company Commander Questionnaire

RTC, San Diego

FORM 86

University of Illinois, Champaign, Illinois

your job as a company commander in general, including all the aspects of your job. Place an X in the circle under the face that best expresses how you feel about



On the next two pages we are going to ask you to rate certain aspects of your job
on scales with seven intervals, such as:
good : : : : : : bad
casy : : : : : difficult
The seven intervals should be interpreted as follows:
EASY : : : : : DIFFICULT extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
Please place your checkmark in the interval that best describes your opinion. For
example, if you were asked to rate "Being stationed in San Diego" and you thought
it was quite good and slightly difficult then you should place your marks as fol-
lows:
BEING STATIONED IN SAN DIEGO
good:_X_::::_bad
easy : : : X : : difficult
In making your ratings, please remember the following points:
1) Place your checkmarks in the middle of spaces, not on the boundaries.
this not this
:::X
2) Be sure you fill out every question on the page - do not omit any.
3) Never put more than one checkmark on a single scale.



BEING A COMPANY COMMANDER

good		:	:	:	·	.:	baď
wise				:	·	:	foolish
beneficial	•	_:	·	·		:	harmful
rewarding				:	.:	:	punishing
pleasant	·:	_:		:	·	:	unpleasant
intelligent	:	_:	·	:	:	:	unintelligent
satisfying	<u> </u>	<u>-:</u>	:	:	:		not satisfying
easy		<u> </u>	·	:	:	·	difficult
•	٠	TRYIN	G TO BR	IGADE.			
good			:	:	:	:	bad
wise							foolish
beneficial		•					harmful
rewarding							punishing
pleasant				•			unpleasant
intelligent							unintelligent
satisfying	₹ .5.3			-			not satisfying
easy							difficult
		•				-	
		Pushin	NG A COM	Pany			
good		.::	:				bad
Wise	:	·:				•	foolish
beneficial	<u> </u>	::	:				harmful
rewarding	:	::				*************	punishing
pleasant	:	·:	;	· 	· ;		unpleasant
ntelligent		::	;		:	-	unintelligent
satisfying		·:	:		:		not satisfying
easy		::		:			difficult



TODAY'S NAVY

good		:	:_	<u>;</u>	:_	<u> </u>	_ bad
wise	:_	:_	:_	<u>.</u>	:_	:	foolish
beneficial	:_	<u></u> :	:_	:_	;	'	harmful
rewarding		·:		:_	:	:	punishing
pleasant		:_	:_	:_	:_	:	unpleasant
intelligent		:_	:_	:_	:_	:	unintelligent
satisfying	·:_	:_	·:	:	:_	:	not satisfying
easy	:_	:_	;	:_		:	difficult

NEW RECRUITS

gnod _	:_	_:	:	:	:_	:	_ bad
vise _	· ;	:	_:_		;	:	foolish
beneficial	:_	_:_	_:_	:_	:	_:	harmful
rewarding _	·	_:_	:	:			punishing
pleasant	·	:	:	:		:	unpleasant
intelligent	:_	:	:	:_	:	_:	unintelligent
satisfying	<u></u> :		:			:	not satisfying
easy _	:		:			:	difficult



The next thing we want to know is, whether you personally feel that performing each of the stated behaviors is good or bad. Once again, we will use a seven interval scale where the intervals should be interpreted as follows:

good			:	_:		• .	:		•	bad
	extremely	qui te	slight	ly nei	ther	sligh	tly	quite	extremely	' ,
	Thus, for	example.	if you	person	allu	feel t	hat	norfor	m4 m.c.	
							-		_	
	behavior X		emera Ro	ooa, yo	u sno	ara br	ace 1	your cl	heckmark	
1	s follows	:	•							
1	Performing	behavio	r X is	good	х:		:		: bad	



1.	Asking other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems is good:::bad
2.	Immediately firin; a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority good : : : : : bad
3.	Automatically selecting a "setback" as my R.C.P.O. is good:: bad
4.	Telling my company that I expect them to shoot for brigade is good:::bad
5.	Taking away phone privileges as a form of discipline is good:_:_:_:_bad
6.	Pre-checking all lockers prior to inspection is good : : : : : bad
7.	Being ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons is good:_:_:_bad
8.	Allowing other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training is good::: bad
9.	Asking other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training is good::::bad
10.	Selecting the toughest-looking recruit for my master-at-arms is good:::bad
11.	Working harder with set-backs than with other recruits is good::: bad
12.	Using "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline is good:::bad
13.	tion is good : : : : : : bad
14.	Punishing the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection is good:_:_:_:_bad
	Telling the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline is good:::bad
16.	Telling my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back" is good:::bad
	Faking a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company is good:::bad
18.	Allowing my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline is good :::; bad
19.	Backing up a recruit petty officer when he exceeds his authority is good:::bad
20.	Asking other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry is good : : : : : : bad
21.	Selecting some recruit officers at R and O is good : : : : : bad



22.	. Using Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge" is
	good:::bad
23.	Allowing my company to use "cheating gear" is
	good::: bad
24.	Attending most instructor-conducted classes is
	good::::bad
25.	Allowing my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes is
	good:::bad
26	Setting agide a greette Atmosphis
	Setting aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems is good::: bad
27.	Being out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge" is
	good:::bad
28.	Regularization and company to the co
-0.	Requiring my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes at night is good:::bad
20	·
29.	of the balded to be the state of the balded
	good:: bad
30.	Having more than two E.P.O.s in one company is
	good::: bad
31.	Pre-inspecting my company on evaluation days is
	good:::bad
32.	Telling my company that brigading is not important is
	good:::bad
33.	Trying to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points is
	good:::bad
34	Disciplining measures to the first section of the f
J.	Disciplining recruits in front of the whole company is
	good:::bad
35.	Learning the last names of every member of my company is
•	good :
36.	good:::bad
30.	Giving out demerits as a form of discipline is
	good:_:_:_bad
37.	Leaving the company pretty much on its own during service week is
	good:::bad
20	
JO.	Disciplining individual recruits in private is
	good::: bad
39 .	Having a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each "setback" is
	good:::_ bad
EO.	Telling my company to come to me with all their personal problems is
	good:: : : bad



On the next four pages we're going to ask you about your past performance of and future intentions concerning, a set of behaviors that Company Commanders may or may not engage in. That is, first we will ask you whether you have or have not performed each behavior (in the past) and then we will ask you if you intend to perform the behavior with your next company. For these latter judgments you will use the following seven-place scale:

I in	tend to::::I do not intend to perform Behavior X.
	The seven intervals should be interpreted as follows:
intend	extremely quite slightly don't slightly quite extremely /intend to certain certain certain certain
	For example, if you are quite certain that you do not intend to perform behavior X with your next company, you should place your mark as follows:
I in	tend to:::: I do not intend to perform Behavior X.
	Again, please remember to:
	1) Place your checkmarks in the middle of spacesnot on the boundaries. this not this : X : : : X
	2) Be sure you fill out every question on the page do not omit any.
,	3) Never put more than one checkmark on a single scale.



have have not asked other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary ı. problems immediately fired a recruit petty officer who deliberately 2. abused his authority automatically selected a "setback" as my R.C.P.O. 3. 4. told my company that I expect them to shoot for brigade 5. taken away phone privileges as a form of discipline 6. pre-checked all lockers prior to inspection been ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons 7. allowed recruits to finish fights that they start among 8. themselves asked other Company Commanders to inspect my company during 9. primary training 10. selected the toughest-looking recruit for my master-at-arms worked harder with set-backs than other recruits 11. I used "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline 12. 13. punished the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection punished the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points 14. in personal inspection 15. told the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline 16. told my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back" Ι 17. faked a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company allowed my recruit petty officers to give physical training 18. (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline backed up a recruit petty officer when he exceeded his 19. authority



20.

21.

22.

bridge"

selected some recruit officers at R and O.

asked other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry

used Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the

have not

23.	I			allowed my company to use "cheating gear"
24.	I			attended most instructor-conducted classes
25.	I		-	allowed my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes
26.	I		*************************************	set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems
27.	I			been out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"
28.	I			required my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night
29.	I		***********	been in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"
30.	I		• •	had more than two E.P.O.s in one company
31.	I			pre-inspected my company on evaluation days
32.	, I			told my company that brigading was not important
33.	I		•	tried to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points
S4.	I			disciplined recruits in front of the whole company
35.	I			learned the last names of every member of my company
36.	I		·	given out demerits as a form of discipline
37.	I			left the company pretty much on its own during service week.
38.	I	,		disciplined individual recruits in private
39.	Ī	70.	*************	had a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each set-back
40.	I			told my company to come to me with all of their personal problems



For	my next company
1.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to ask other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems
2.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority
3.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to automatically select a "setback" as my R.C.P.O.
4.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to tell my com-
5.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to take away phone privileges as a form of discipline
6.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to pre-check all lockers prior to inspection
7.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to be ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons
8.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to allow recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves
9.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to ask other Company Commanders to inspect my company during primary training
10.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to select the toughest-looking recruit for my master-at-arms
11.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to work harder with set-backs than with other recruits
12.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to use "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline
13.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection
14.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection
15.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to tell the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline
16.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back"
17.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company



For my next company....

18.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping jacks) as a form of discipline
19.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to back up a recruit petty officer when he exceeds his authority
20.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to ask other Company Commanders to help me teach infantry
21.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to select come recruit officers at R and O
22.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to use Sunday afternoons for infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"
23.	I intend to : : : : : : I'do not intend to allow my company to use "cheating gear"
24.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to attend most instructor-conducted classes
25.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to allow my E.P.O. to handle most questions after T.V. classes
26.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems
27.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to be out of the barracks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"
28.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to require my company to study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night
29.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to be in the barracks at or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"
30.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to have more than 2 E.P.O.s in one company
31.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to pre-inspect my company on evaluation days
32.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to tell my com- pany that brigading is not important
33.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points
34.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to discipline recruits in front of the whole company
35.	I intend to : : : : I do not intend to learn the last names of every member of my company



20.	my next company
36.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to give out demerits as a form of discipline
37.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.
38.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to discipline individual recruits in private
39.	I intend to : : : : : : I do not intend to have a 10 of 15 minute private talk with each setback
40.	I intend to : : : : : I do not intend to tell my company to come to me with all of their personal problems.



We would now like to know whether you believe that certain other people (other Company Commanders and the MTO) think you should or should not perform each behavior. Once again, seven-place scales will be used, and the intervals should be interpreted as follows:

I	should		:			:			I should no				
		oxtreme.	ly q	uite	slightly	don't	slightly	quite	extremely				
		certain	Ce	rtain	certain	know	certain	certain	certain				
				•			,		•				
	For	For example, you might be asked if "Most Battalion Commanders" think you											
	sho	should perform behavior X. If you are extremely certain that "most battalion											
		-				-			en you wou!				
	you	r checkm	ark a	s foll	ows:				ŧc	-			
•			-	M	ost Batta	lion Co	ommanders	think:					
	I s	hould	:	: :	: :	: X	should n	ot perfor	rm behavio	r X.			



Most	other Company	Commander	s I respe	ct thin	k					
1.	I should Commanders fo	: : r help wit	: : h discipl	: :	I roblem	should s	not	ask other	Company	
2.	I should recruit petty	officer w	: : ho delibe	: :	I nbuses	should his au	not thori	immediate y	ly fire a	i
3.	I should a "setback" a	: : s my R.C.P	: <u>.</u>	_ : :	1	should	not	automatic	ally sele	:C1
4.	I should I expect them	to shoot	for briga	; de	1	should	not	tell my c	ompany th	. a 1
5.	I should vileges as a	form of di	cipline	- <u>:</u> :	1	should	not	take away	phone pr	1-
6.	I should prior to insp	ection	·:	_::	I	should	not	pre-check	all lock	e:
7.	I should in teaching t	: : he I.G. le	::	-::	1	should	not	be ahead	of schedu	10
8,	I should finish fights	that they	start am	ong the	I mselve:	should	not	allow rec	ruits to	
9.	I should Commanders to	inspect m	company	during	Ţ prima:	should ry train	not ing	ask other	Company	
10.	I should looking recru	it for my	master-at	arms	I	should	not	select th	e toughes	t-
11.	I should set-backs tha	: : n with other	r recrui	:: ts	I	should	not	work hard	er with	
12.	I should Georgia" as a	iorm of d	: Scipline	. ::	I	should	not	use "Marc	hing to	
13.	I should company when	: : 3 recruits	have los	t points	I in 1	should ocker in	not spect	punish the	e whole	
14.	I should company when	: : 3 recruits	have los	t points	I in pe	should	not inspe	punish the	• whole	
15.	I should ignore a recr	: : uit as a i	rm of dis	: Scipline	I	should	not	tell the	company to	Ď
16.	I should that I don't	: : believe in	"setting	back"	1	should	not	tell my r	ecrui ts	14
17.	I should a recruit in	order to so	are the	::	I	should	not	fake a be	ating with	h
	I should petty officer as a form of	to give	hysical	raining	I (suc)	should as pus	not h-ups	allow my :	regruit Ing jacks	` }_
•	as a rotm or	arscrbiide		87-	85			•	•	

Most	other Company Commanders I respect think		
19.	I should : : : : : : : : : I petty officer when he exceeds his authority	should not	back up a recruit
20.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	should not	ask other Company
21.	I should : : : : : : : I officers at R and 0	should not	select some recruit
22.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	should not	use Sunday afternoons
23.	I should : : : : : : 1 use "cheating gear"		allow my company to
24.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	should not	attend most instructor
25.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	allow my E.P.O. to
26.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not lems	set aside a specific
27.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :		be out of the barracks
28.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not 45 minutes a	require my company to night
29.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	
30.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	_	have more than two
31.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	pre-inspect my company
32.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	tell my company that
33.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	try to "hide" a
34.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	discipline recruits
35.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	learn the last names
36.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	give out demerits as



mos t	other Company Commanders I respect think	•	. •
37.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	leave the company
	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :		
39.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :	I should not	have a 10 or 15
40.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :		

The I	Military Training Officer thinks
	I should : : : : : : : : : : : I should not ask other Company Commanders for help with disciplinary problems
2.	I should : : : : : : : : : : : I should not immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority
3.	I should : : : : : : I should not automatically select a "setback" as my R.C.P.O.
4.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my company that I expect them to brigade
5.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not take away phone pri-
6.	I should ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
	I should : : : : : : : I should not be ahead of schedule in teaching the I.G. lessons
'8.	I should : : : : : I should not allow recruits to finish fights that they start among themselves
9.	
	I should : : : : : I should not select the toughest-looking recruit for my master-at-arms
11.	I should : : : : : : : : I should not work harder with setbacks than with other recruits
12.	I should : : : : : I should not use "Marching to Georgia" as a form of discipline
13.	I should : : : : I should not punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in locker inspection
14.	I should : : : : : I should not punish the whole company when 3 recruits have lost points in personal inspection
15.	I should : : : : : : I should not tell the company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline
16.	I should I should not tell my recruits
	I should : : : : : : I should not fake a beating with



The	ilitary Training Officer thinks	
18.	I should : : : : : I should not allow my recrepetty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups and jumping as a form of discipline	uit . jacks)
19.	I should : : : : : I should not back up a recrepetty officer when he exceeds his authority	uit
	I should : : : : : : I should not ask other Components to help me teach infantry	
21.	I should : : : : : I should not select some reofficers at R and O	ecruit
22.	I should : : : : : I should not use Sunday after infantry drill after "crossing the bridge"	ternoon
23.	I should : : : : : : I should not allow my companie "cheating gear"	any to
24.	should : : : : : I should not attend most in	struc-
25.	I should : : : : : : I should not allow my E.P.(). to
26.	should : : : : : I should not set aside a spring period each week to handle recruit problems	ecific
27.	should : : : : : I should not be out of the racks by 1800 hours after "crossing the bridge"	bar-
28.	should : : : : : I should not require my conto study for their academic tests for at least 45 minutes a night	pany
29.	should : : : : : I should not be in the barrat or before reveille after "crossing the bridge"	acks
30.	should : : : : : I should not have more than	two .
31.	should : : : : : I should not pre-inspect my company on evaluation days	,
32.	should : : : : : : I should not tell my companish to brigading is not important	· V
33.	should : : : : : I should not try to "hide" ecruit who might cost the company points	
34.	should : : : : : I should not discipline rec	ruits



The	Military Training Officer Chinas	
35.	I should : : : : : : : I should not learn the last name of every member of my company	nes
36.	I should : : : : : I should not give out demerits a form of discipline	rs
37.	I should : : : : : I should not leave the company pretty much on its own during service week	•
38.	I should : : : : : I should not discipline indivi-	du a l
39.	I should : : : : : I should not have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback	
40.	I should : : : : : I should not tell my company t come to me with all their personal problems	0



In this final part of the questionnaire we are going to ask you for your opinions about various aspects of your job and recruit training in general. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following questions by checking the appropriate answer.



	Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neithor Agree nor Disagree	Slightly	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disegree
M.B.D. inspectors are fair and impartial in their evaluation							
I feel that the whole company would benefit if I could take a wiseguy out behind the barracks every now and oven				_			
If I could only win one flag; I'd want it to be the athletic flag.							
The way things are run now, recruit training is just like a summer camp for kids			1				1
I don't mind bending the rules a little when I think it will help my company in the competition							
The tougher I act, the better my company does							
Instructors of group dynamics courses should alert company commanders to problems observed in class							
When an RCPO is fired he should be transferred to another company			gampin is and				1
I feel that my training affects a man all his life and not just during his Navy career		1	- 1				
Generally speaking, I want to do what the Military Training Officer thinks I should do							

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10.

pany doesn't alway le to discipline I would (or do) children, I'd tundes I would (or do) children, I'd tundes I wan one flag, by the military flampany were the ken the competition aman loses the recruit a man loses the ses points in bastion that doesn't bri aking, I want to anding officer fing thinks I showen in the compairment of spending 59 minutes sting 59 minutes	The best company doesn't alway brigade If I were able to discipline r the same way I would (or do) d pline my own children, I'd turbetter companies If I could only win one flag, want it to be the military flag. Even if my company were the be I wouldn't win the competition You have to be tougher with see backs than with other recruits It's worse if a man loses the pany points in personal inspection. Men in a company that brigades do better in the fleet than men in a company that doesn't brigate for recruit training thinks I should If I have 60 men in the company every minute I have to spend when in a wasting 59 minutes.
	Meree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree Disagree Agree Disagree Dis
	Agree nor Slightly Moderately Disagree Disagree Disagree
Moderately Agree	Slightly Moderately Disagree Disagree
	Woderately Disagree
Slightly Agree	
Slightly Agree nor Agree Disagree	Strongly
Slightly Agree nor Slightly Agree of Disagree Disagree Disagree	

want it to be the academic flag 22. First comes fear, then respect 23. All I want a recruit to do is try his best 24. What my company does reflects on me 25. If the company loses a lot of points it means I've done a lousy job with them 26. I personally feel that with some recruits a good swift kick in the butt would be a lot more effective than a marching party 27. A good CC feels like he can brigade every time he pushes a company 28. During the first few days of training, the best way to motivate a company is through fear 29. It is important to me to brigade my company
23. First comes fear, then respectively best try his best try his best on me . 24. What my company does reflect on me . 25. If the company loses a lot o points it means I've done a lousy job with them recruits a good swift kick it butt would be a lot more eff than a marching party. 27. A good CC feels like he can every time he pushes a company the first few days of training, the best way to me a company is through fear any company.
23. All I want a recruit to do i try his best on as . 24. What my company does reflect on as . 25. If the company loses a lot o points it means I've done a lousy job with them recruits a good swift kick i butt would be a lot more eff than a marching party 27. A good CC feels like he can every time he pushes a company time he best way to mo a company is through fear 29. It is important to me to bri my company
24. What my company does reflect on me 25. If the company loses a lot o points it means I've done a lousy job with them 26. I personally feel that with recruits a good swift kick i butt would be a lot more eff than a marching party 27. A good CC feels like he can every time he pushes a compacting the first few days of training, the best way to me a company is through fear any company. 29. It is important to me to bri my company.
25. If the company loses a lot o points it means I've done a lousy job with them 26. I personally feel that with recruits a good swift kick i butt would be a lot more eff than a marching party 27. A good CC feels like he can every time he pushes a compacting the first few days of training, the best way to me a company is through fear a goognany is through fear my company
 26. I personally feel that with recruits a good swift kick i butt would be a lot more eff than a marching party 27. A good CC feels like he can every time he pushes a compacting the first few days of training, the best way to me a company is through fear 29. It is important to me to bri my company
A good CC feels like he can every time he pushes a compa During the first few days of training, the best way to mo a company is through fear it is important to me to bri my company
During the first few days of training, the best way to most company is through fear It is important to me to bri my company
It is important to me to bri my company

Many of the things I do as a CC are checked unnecessarily by supervisors

31.

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boring being a CC becomes I feel satisfied about the which I get feedback about as a Company Commander. Putting in effert to do my a CC well really isn't work why being a CC really won't anything in the long run of the more freedom in determined in the long run lead more freedom in determined in should accomplish my objectives		I like the actual work invobeing a Company Commander One good thing about being that I decide how to do my that I decide how to do my I'm doing in my work as a C Commander to allow me to coerrors and improve my performough to talk about it wit people who are not involved recruit training Being a Company Commander i that allows me to continual something worthwhile	Strongly	Modera :ely Agr 3e	Agree	Agree nor	Slightly	Moderately Disagree	
which I get feedback about the way in which I get feedback about my work as a Company Commander Putting in effort to do my job as a CC well really isn't worth it My being a CC really won't affect anything in the long run I could accomplish more as a CC if I had more freedom in determining objectives		The more companies I push, the more boring being a CC becomes							
		-						. 1	
	_								
	-			1					

S C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C		trongly	Moderately	Slightly	Neither Agree nor	Slightly	Moderately Negates	Strongly
		Agree	Agres	Agree	Ulsagree	DISagree	2218161	9.15.73
4	2. Some parts of a Company Commander's job really do not make sense							
¥	43. If I could reorganize the work involved in being a CC, I could do the job more effectively					Ì		
*	44. I often feel like a cog in the machinery and that what I do doesn't matter much							
*	45. When I'm pushing a company I often feel that I waste my time because the work involved is organized badly					, grá		
	46. When I'm pushing a company I'm usually able to arrange much of my own schedule with regard to when things are done						Action	
6	47. I often feel that trying to do my job as a CC better gets me nowhere	1						
~	48. When I'm pushing a company I often wish I had more freedom in planning or doing my work .							
4 7	49. The actual work involved in being a CC is often distasteful to me	-	İ					
ö	50. Being a Company Commander is marking timejust putting in time on a temporary job					İ		

APPENDIX E SCREEN COPIES OF SAMPLE MATERIALS USED IN

BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS PROGRAM



Please look at the following list of goals. In a moment, we will ask you to choose five goals from this list to be used later on. If what you consider to be your most important goal is not on the list, you may add it by pressing the HELP Otherwise just and following the instructions. press the NEXT key.

- 1. Staying out of trouble
 - 2. Obtaining promotions
- 3. Enjoying my work
- 4. Doing well in the competition
- Being well liked by other Company Commanders
 - 6. Doing the best job possible
 - 7. Reaching retirement
- 8. Training recruits to become good Navy men
- Developing morale and respect in my recruits
- Receiving favorable evaluations from my superiors



behaviors you might use to make yourself a more effective asking you to indicate whether or not you intend to perform certain behaviors as a Company Commander Company Commander. We will begin this lesson by We are now interested in learning the kinds of

Please indicate your intention on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 that looks like this:

I intend to train good recruits

numbers may be interpreted as follows: You are to enter that number which best represents your opinion (do not do so yet since this is just an example). The

1 = the statement is definitely false
2 = the statement is probably false
3 = the statement is neither true nor false
4 = the statement is probably true
5 = the statement is definitely true

Press NEXT to begin



I intend to

back up a recruit Petty Officer when he has exceeded his authority

Enter the number that best represents your opinion and then press the NEXT key

ф Д 1 = the statement is definitely false
2 = the statement is probably false
3 = the statement is neither true nor fals
4 = the statement is probably true
5 = the statement is definitely true

Press NEXT

behaviors in more detail. In particular, we want you to performing a behavior is most likely to lead to each of tell us if you think that performing a behavior or not We would now like you to consider some of these the goals you previously indicated. For example, consider a behavior such as "obeying orders. If you think you are more likely to reach your goal by performing this behavior (that is, by obeying orders) you should enter the number 1 after the goal (the list will be presented in a minute).

엄 If you think you are most likely to reach your goal by performing the behavior (that is, <u>not</u> obeying orders) you should enter the number 2.

If you are not sure whether performing or not performing the behavior is most likely to lead to your goal, put a B after the goal

Remember,

- 1 means you are most likely to reach the goal by performing the behavior
- 2 means you are most likely to reach the goal by not performing the behavior
- performing the behavior is most likely to lead to means you are not sure whether performing or not goal

Press NEXT to try an example



Enter the number which best represents your opinion

Behavior:

Obeying orders

<u>Goals</u> Staying out of trouble

Obtaining promotions

Enjoying my work

Doing well in the competition

Being well liked by other Company Commanders

I means you are most likely to reach the goal by performing the behavior

2 means you are most likely to reach the goal by not performing the behavior

performing the behavior is most likely to lead to means you are not sure whether performing or not your goal



should not perform this behavior. Please indicate your own commanding officers think you should or We would like to know whether or not you think this on the scales below:

The MTO thinks I should

back up a recruit Petty Officer when he has exceeded his authority

Enter the number that best represents your opinion and then press the NEXT key

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1 = the statement is definitely false
2 = the statement is probably false
3 = the statement is neither true nor false
4 = the statement is probably true
5 = the statement is definitely true

back up a recruit Petty Officer when he has exceeded You said that the MTO thinks you should not his authority

That's Right !

So, given the fact that you feel you will reach more of your goals if you do not perform this behavior the behavior, perhaps you should reconsider your and that the MTO thinks you should not perform intention.

Press NEXT for another behavior



ask other Company Commanders to help teach infantry You indicated earlier you do not intend to

Consistent with this, you believe that you will reach goals by not performing this behavior. However, let's consider the expectation of your commanding officer more of your

Press NEXT



We would like to know whether or not you think your own commanding officers think you should or should not perform this behavior. Please indicate this on the scales below:

The MTO thinks I should

ask other Company Commanders to help teach infantry

Enter the number that best represents your opinion and then press the NEXT key

N ≪

- 1 = the statement is definitely false
 - 2 = the statement is probably false
- 4 = the statement is probably true

statement

the

false

is neither true nor

5 = the statement is definitely true



ask other Company Commanders to help teach infantry You said that the MTO thinks you should not

ask other Company Commanders to help teach infantry This is incorrect, the MTO thinks that you should

Cooperation among company commanders makes for better training.

this behavior, do you still feel you will reach more perform Given that the MTO thinks you should of your goals by not performirg

Type in yes or no, then press NEXT

2

Good. We hope considering this will help make you a more effective company commander.

Press NEXT for another behavior



Company Commercer 1 15

Above average in standings in the competition

Outstanding at handling set backs

at cooperating with all those in his chain of command Above average

in terms of his company's conduct after the competitive period Below average

at showing an interest in his recruits Average

Outstanding at leading a balanced company

How would you rate this person as a Company Commander? (Enter a number between 1 and 7 using the scale shown, then press NEXT) \gg

7= very good 6= moderately good 5= slightly good

3=slightly bad 2=moderately bad 1= very bad



Appendix G

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND t VALUES FOR THE PRE-TRAINING MEASURES OF THE BEHAVIORAL EVALUATIONS



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TABLE G-1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND t VALUES FOR THE PRE-TRAINING MEASURES OF THE BEHAVIORAL EVALUATIONS

			Control		Exp.	
		· X	SD	x	SD	t
1.	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	5.53	1.17	5.00	1.91	1.02
2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	5.74	1.48	5.53	2.06	. 36
3.	Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	5.37	1.21	5.89	1.45	1.21
4.	Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	5.26	1.63	4.84	1.42	. 85
5.	Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons.	5.89	1.37	5.74	1.91	.29
6.	Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	6.53	.70	6.42	.96	.39
7.	Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	0.63	.60	6.74	.73	.49
8.	Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	6.05	.78	6.16	.96	.37
9.	To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	6.32	.75	6.63	.50	1.53
10.	Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline.	3.53	1.84	3.37	1.95	.26
11.	Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	4.89	1.85	5.47	1.90	.95
12.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	2.95	1.65	2.26	1.85	1.20
13.	Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	1.79	1.27	2.10	1.79	.63
14.	Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	2.63	1.67	2.05	1.31	1.19
15.	Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	3.16	1.77	3.11	2.00	1.09

[·] Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.



TABLE G-1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATION, AND I VALUES FOR THE PRE-TRAINING MEASURES OF THE BEHAVIORAL EVALUATIONS (cont.)

	Control		Exp.		
	<u>x</u>	នប្	· x	SD	t
Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline.	1.26	.73	1.26	.73	0.0
Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority.	2.53	1.50	2.68	1.95	.28
Ask other CC to help teach infantry.	5.05	1.58	5.37	1.32	.71
Select some recruit officers at R and O.	4.58	1.12	5.11	1.56	1.19
Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.	3.79	1.72	3.84	1.80	.09
Allow my company to use "cheating gear."	3.32	1.57	2.89	1.82	.76
Attend most anstructor-conducted classes.	5.42	1.17	5.89	1.56	1.06
Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes.	3.63	1.38	3.74	1,45	.23
Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection.	3.00	1.60	2.63	2.14	.60
Automatically select a setback as my RCPO.	2.63	1.38	2.47	1.35	.36
Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night.	6.47	. 84	6.42	1.02	.17
Discipline individual recruits in private.	5.11	1.88	4.68	1.95	.68
Have more than two EPOs in one company.	6.05	1.08	6.00	1.15	.15
Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days.	5.68	1.60	6.00	1,20	.69
Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points.	2.58	1.43	1.95	1.35	1.40
Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company.	4.53	1.81	5.00	1.70	. 83
Learn the last name of every member of my company.	5.95	1.03	6.47	. 84	1.73
	physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline. Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority. Ask other CC to help teach infantry. Select some recruit officers at R and O. Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week. Allow my company to use "cheating gear." Attend most instructor-conducted classes. Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night. Discipline individual recruits in private. Have more than two EPOs in one company. Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days. Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points. Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company. Learn the last name of every member of my	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline. Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority. Ask other CC to help teach infantry. 5.05 Select some recruit officers at R and O. 4.58 Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week. Allow my company to use "cheating gear." 3.32 Attend most instructor-conducted classes. 5.42 Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. 2.63 Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night. Discipline individual recruits in private. 5.11 Have more than two EPOs in one company. 6.05 Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days. 5.68 Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points. Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company. Learn the last name of every member of my 5.95	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline. Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority. Ask other CC to help teach infantry. Select some recruit officers at R and O. Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week. Allow my company to use "cheating gear." Allow my company to use "cheating gear." Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes. Funish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. Automatically select a night. Discipline individual recruits in private. Signal 1.38 Have more than two EPOs in one company. Funish my company on evaluation days. Funishers the arecruit who might cost the company points. Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company. Learn the last name of every member of my 5.95 1.03	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline. Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority. Ask other CC to help teach infantry. Select some recruit officers at R and O. Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week. Allow my company to use "cheating gear." Attend most instructor-conducted classes. Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes. Funish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. Back up a recruit officers at R and O. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. Can 1.38 2.47 Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night. Discipline individual recruits in private. Can 1.38 4.68 Have more than two EPOs in one company. Can 1.38 1.60 Can 1	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline. Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority. Ask other CC to help teach infantry. Select some recruit officers at R and O. Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week. Allow my company to use "cheating gear." Attend most instructor-conducted classes. Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes. Aunish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night. Discipline individual recruits in private. Discipline individual recruit who might cost the company points. Discipline a recruit who might cost the company. Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company. Learn the last name of every member of my 5.95 1.03 6.47 .84

Note: Scale scored l=extremely bad, 4=neither good nor bad, and 7=extremely good



Appendix H

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND ${\bf t}$ VALUES FOR THE PRE-TRAINING PERCEPTIONS OF THE NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER RESPECTED CC



TABLE H-1. MANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t VALUES FOR THE PRE-TRAINING PERCEPTIONS OF THE NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER RESPECTED CC

		Control		Exp.		
_		x	SD	x	SD	<u>t</u>
1.	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	5.00	1.97	4.53	1.61	.81
2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	5.68	1.73	5.47	1.90	.36
3.	Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	5.11	1.76	5.21	1.81	.18
4.	Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	5.74	1.09	5.16	1.68	1.26
5.	Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching . IG lessons.	5.89	1.04	6.05	1.03	.47
6.	Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	2.11	1.76	2.03	1.51	.30
7.	Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	6.37	.83	6.53	. 84	.58
8.	Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	5.63	1.30	6.16	.96	1.42
9.	To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	5.79	1.36	6.16	.96	.97
10.	Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discoline.	3.74	1.94	3.52	1.75	.35
11.	Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	4.95	1.93	5.21	1.84	.43
12.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	2.79	1.75	2.74	1.82	.09
13.	Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	2.42	1.74	2.37	1.83	.09
14.	Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	2.58	2.01	2.94	2.09	.55
15.	Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	2.95	2.17	3.21	1.87	.40
						-

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.

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TABLE H-1. MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND t VALUES FOR THE PRE-TRAINING PERCEPTIONS OF THE NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER RESPECTED CC (cont.)

	IS OF THE NORMATIVE BELIEFS OF OTHER RESPECTED CC		_				
.)			rol	$\frac{\text{Exp}}{}$.			
_		x	SD	<u>x</u>	SD	<u>t</u>	
16.	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline.	2.10	1.79	1.89	1.33	.41	
17.	Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority.	3.00	1.76	3.00	1.49	.00	
18.	Ask other CC to help teach infantry.	5.37	1.80	5.53	1.07	.33	
19.	Select some recruit officers at R and O.	4.68	1.53	5.05	1.58	.73	
20.	Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.	4.21	1.27	4.32	1.80	.21	
21.	Allow my company to use "cheating gear."	4.21	1.40	3.32	2.08	1.55	
22.	Attend most instructor-conducted classes.	5.32	1.42	5.11	1.37	.47	
23.	Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes.	4.58	1.39	3.68	1.40	1.01	
24.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection.	2.84	1.71	3.21	2.10	.59	
25.	Automatically select a setback as my RCPO	2.21	1.47	2.74	1.63	1.04	
26.	Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night.	6.53	.77	6.42	.90	. 39	
27.	Discipline individual recruits in private.	4.58	1.84	4.74	1.59	.28	
28.	Have more than two EPOs in one company.	5.53	1.39	5.00	1.60	1.08	
29.	Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days.	5.84	1.38	5.58	1.17	.63	
30.	Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points.	2.68	1.94	2.79	1.54	.18	
31.	Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company.	4.63	1.86	4.63	1.46	÷.00	
32.	Learn the last name of every member of my company.	5.79	1.23	5.95	.97	.44	

Note: Scales scored l=should not, 4=don't know, and 7=should perform the behavior



Appendix I

MEANJ AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR TWO GROUPS ON FEEDER EVALUATION AT GRADUATION OF CC SCHOOL

TABLE 1-1. MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR TWO GROUPS ON FEEDER EVALUATION AT GRADUATION OF CC SCHOOL

		•				
		Con	trol	Experimental		
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
. 1.	Performance of Duty	9.63	. 80	9.57	1.04	
. 2.	Endurance	9.63	. 80	9.78	1.00	
3.	Personal Appearance*	10.15	.98	9.31	1.21	
4.	Cooperativeness	10.05-	1.04	9.57	1.31	
5.	Reliability	9.68	1.07	9.73	1.16	
6.	Initiative	9.36	.98	9.47	1.46	
7.	Conduct	9.94	1.04	9.63	1.30	
8.	Potential	9.63	. 92	9.78	1.00	
9.	Resourcefulness	1.00	o .	1.00	0	
10.	Leadership: Directing	9.05	1.09	9.26	1.24	
11.	Leadership: Counseling	1.00	0	1.00	0	
12.	Writing	9.52	1.04	9.15	1.30	
13.	Speaking	9.31	.97	9.05	1.19	
14.	Co. Organization	1.00	0	1.00	0	
15.	Co. Discipline	1.00	0.	1.00	0	
16.	Infantry Eval.	9.68	.92	9.84	1.03	
17.	Bag Eval.	10.05	.99	9.84	1.18	
18.	Academic Eval.	9.47	.99	9.52	1.14	
19.	Administrative	7.10	3.74	7.68	3.62	
20.	Overall Eval.	9.42	.93	9.57	1.22	

^{*}t=2.35, df=36, p=.024





Appendix J

M'AN EVALUATION OF EACH BEHAVIORAL ITEM ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP



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TABLE J-1. MEAN EVALUATION OF EACH BEHAVIORAL ITEM ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP

		Exp.	Con- trol	t
1.	Ask other company commanders for help with a discipline problem.	4.92	4.50	.56
2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	6.08	6.14	.11
3.	Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade.	4.83	5.07	.28
4.	Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	5.83	4.43	1.87*
5.	Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons.	4.75	6.14	2.07*
6.	Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves.	6.17	5.86	.65
7.	Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training.	6.67	5.93	1.65+
8.	Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	6.00	6.36	.92
9.	To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback.	6.75	6.14	1.61
10.	Use "Marching through Georgia" as 2 form of discipline.	2.17	2.64	.76
11.	Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.	5.00	5.00	0
12.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection.	1.92	2.64	1.25
13.	Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline.	1.75	2.29	.91
14.	Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back."	2.33	2.64	.40
<u>15</u> .	Fake a beating with a recruit in order to scare the company.	1.83	2.50	1.12
				

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed. 123



TABLE J-1. MEAN EVALUATION OF EACH BEHAVIORAL ITEM ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP (cont.)

Exp. trol t Allow my recruit petty officers to give 16. 2.17 1.93 physical training (such as push-ups) as a .42 form of discipline. Back up a recruit petty officer when he has 17. 3.00 2.93 .11 exceeded his authority. 18. Ask other CC to help teach infantry. 6.08 5.00 1.85* Select some recruit officers at R and O. 5.67 5.21 . 86 Leave the company pretty much on its own 20. 1.89* 3.00 4.21 during service week. Allow my company to use "cheating gear." 21. 2.42 2.79 .50 Attend most instructor-conducted classes. 5.67 4.64 1.71* 22. Allow my EPO - to handle most questions 23. 3.17 3.93 1.20 after TV classes. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits 24. 2.17 2.43 .42 lose points in locker inspection. Automatically select a setback as my RCPO. 25. 2.00 2.00 0 Require my company to study for their academic 26. 1.74* 7.00 6.78 tests at least 45 minutes a night. Discipline individual recruits in private. 27. 6.25 5.57 1.13 6.43 Have more than two EPOs in one company. 6.67 .63 28. 6.08 1.13 Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days. 5.36 29. Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the 30. 2.17 2.86 1.05 company points. Discipline a recruit in front of the whole 31. 4.17 4.79 .50 company. Learn the last name of every member of my 32. 6.75 6.43 .95 company.

^{*} p < .05 Note: Scales were scored l=negative evaluation and 7=positive evaluation 124



Appendix K

MEAN PERCEPTION OF NORMATIVE BELIEFS FOR THE MTO ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP



TABLE K-1. MEAN PERCEPTION OF NORMATIVE BELIEFS FOR THE MTO ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP

6. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. 7. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. 8. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. 6.75 6.29 1.15 9. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. 10. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. 1.00 1.36 1.33 11. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems.			Exp.	Con- trol	<u>t</u>
deliberately abuses his authority. 3. Tell my company I expect them to shoot for brigade. 4. Precheck lockers prior to an inspection. 5.17 4.71 .52 5. Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons. 6. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. 7. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. 8. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. 6.75 6.29 1.15 9. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. 10. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. 11. Set aside a specific time period each week form of discipline. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	1.		4.75	4.57	.21
brigade. 4. Procheck lockers prior to an inspection. 5.17 4.71 .52 5. Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons. 6. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. 7. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. 8. Give out domerits as a form of discipline. 6.75 6.29 1.15 9. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. 10. Use 'Marching through Georgia' as a form of discipline. 11. Set aside a specific time period each week for the handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	2.	Immediately fire a recruit petty officer who deliberately abuses his authority.	6.00	5.64	.51
5. Try to be ahead of schedule in teaching IG lessons. 6. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. 7. Ask another company cormander to inspect my company during primary training. 8. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. 9. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. 10. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. 11. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	3.		5.58	5.57	.02
IG lessons. 6. Allow recruits to finish fights they start among themselves. 7. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. 8. Give out domerits as a form of discipline. 6.75 6.29 1.15 9. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. 10. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. 11. Set aside a specific time period each week form of the handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	4.	Precheck lockers prior to an inspection.	5.17	4.71	.52
among themselves. 7. Ask another company commander to inspect my company during primary training. 8. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. 6.75 6.29 1.15 9. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. 10. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. 11. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	5.	•	3.58	5.86	2.91
my company during primary training. 8. Give out demerits as a form of discipline. 9. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. 10. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. 11. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	6.		1.08	2.14	1.82
9. To have a 10 or 15 minute private talk with each setback. 10. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. 11. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	7.		6.00	5.21	1.35
each setback. 10. Use "Marching through Georgia" as a form of discipline. 11. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	8.	Give out demerits as a form of discipline.	6.75	6.29	1.15
discipline. 1.00 1.36 1.33 11. Set aside a specific time period each week to handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 1.50 2.07 2.67 1.50 1.66 1.50 1.50 1.50	9.		6.75	5.86	2.10
to handle recruit problems. 12. Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in personal inspection. 13. Tell my company to ignore a recruit as a form of discipline. 15. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 16. Take a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	10.		1.0 0	1.36	1.33
points in personal inspection. 1.42 2.29 1.98 1.50 2.07 2.07 .93 1.50 2.07 2.07 .93 1.50 2.07 1.66 1.50 2.07 1.66 1.50 2.07 1.66	11.		5.92	6.00	.17
of discipline. 14. Tell my recruits that I don't believe in "setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	12.		1.42	2.29	1.98
"setting back." 15. Fake a beating with a recruit in order to 1.17 1.86 1.53	13.		1.50	2.07	.93
	14.		2.67	1.50	1.66
	15.	-	1.17	1.86	1.53

Note: Underlined item identification numbers indicate that the behavior should not be performed. All other behaviors are expected to be performed.



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TABLE K-1. MEAN PERCEPTION OF NORMATIVE BELIEFS FOR THE MTO ON FINAL QUESTIONNAIRE BY GROUP (cont.) Con-

		Exp.	trol		<u>t</u>
16.	Allow my recruit petty officers to give physical training (such as push-ups) as a form of discipline.	1.00	1.50		1.34
17.	Back up a recruit petty officer when he has exceeded his authority.	2.00	2.64		.92
18.	Ask other CC to help teach infantry.	6.00	4.36		2.36
19.	Select some recruit officers at R and O.	4.92	4.57		.50
20.	Leave the company pretty much on its own during service week.	2.50	3.50		1.39
21.	Allow my company to use "cheating gear."	1.25	1.50		.74
22.	Attend most instructor-conducted classes.	6.17	5.36		1.66
23.	Allow my EPO to handle most questions after TV classes.	2.92	2.79	,,,,,	.17
24.	Punish my whole company when 3 recruits lose points in locker inspection.	1.58	2.28		1.39
25.	Automatically select a setback as my RCPO.	2.67	2.21		.63
26.	Require my company to study for their academic tests at least 45 minutes a night.	7.00	6.36		1.92*
27.	Discipline individual recruits in private.	6.17	5.07		1.88*
28.	Have more than two EPOs in one company.	5.60	5.28		2.02*
29.	Pre-inspect my company on evaluation days.	5.50	5.21		.36
30.	Try to "hide" a recruit who might cost the company points.	1.25	1.64		1.11
31.	Discipline a recruit in front of the whole company.	2.83	2.86		.03
32.	Learn the last name of every member of my company.	7.00	6.43		1.70*

^{*} p <.05

^{**} p < .01 Note: Scales were scored l=should not and 7=should perform the behavior 127/128

